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NOTE
The Medical Resident Working Hours Debate: A Proposal




The debate over the regulation of resident working hours has been one of the
most significant recent controversies in graduate medical education. A diverse
array of organizations, including Congress, state governments, administrative
agencies, and the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education
(ACGME), have had to confront this issue at some point over the past two
decades. While a consensus has developed that at least some aspects of resident
working conditions should be regulated in order to enhance patient safety, there
remains an ongoing controversy over which organizations should implement and
oversee these regulations.
This Note examines and evaluates the costs and benefits of allowing certain
bodies to regulate physician residency programs. Although most scholarship has
promoted regulation either by governmental entities, the ACGME, or residents
themselves, none of these groups is suited to this task. This Note argues that the
ideal regulatory system should involve a decentralized private sector approach,
achieved by ending the ACGME monopoly over graduate medical education
accreditation and allowing for multiple accrediting agencies. Switching to a
private decentralized system would allow for greater experimentation, which
would increase the likelihood of discovering the best way to regulate resident
* J.D. candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School; A.L.M. candidate, Harvard
University; M.Bioethics candidate, University of Pennsylvania Medical School. I would like to
thank Kristin Madison, Andrew Morriss, Gideon Parchomovsky, and Eugene Volokh for their
continued inspiration and support.
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working conditions to enhance patient safety.
I. PURPOSES OF RESIDENT WORK HOUR REGULATION
Although a consensus has emerged that residents have traditionally worked
an unacceptable number of hours per week,' the individuals and organizations
that support resident work hour limitations do so for different reasons. Three of
the primary reasons are patient safety, resident health and quality of life, and
residency program educational quality.
A. Patient Safety
The most common, and perhaps most compelling, argument for resident
work hour regulation deals with a potential externality caused by long work
hours: decreased patient care quality. Multiple studies have shown that sleep loss
and fatigue adversely affect resident performance. An early study, conducted in
1972, found that sleep-deprived surgical residents were more likely to make
2poorly planned maneuvers . Later studies have reported similar findings. One
1998 study of surgical residents found that sleep-deprived residents made twenty
percent more errors and took fourteen percent more time to complete tasks; 3 a
2001 study with a larger sample size found that sleep deprivation resulted in an
approximately two-fold increase in errors and approximately thirty-eight percent
more time to complete tasks.4
Researchers examining non-surgical residents found similar results. Two
early studies found that residents tested after a rested night made almost half as
many errors as residents who suffered sleep loss, 5 and that junior physicians'
reasoning test scores reliably deteriorated with eight hours of cumulative sleep
debt.6 Various later studies have found that long hours of work in non-surgical
1. See infra Sections II.B-C (providing an overview of current attitudes toward resident work
hour regulations).
2. Leonard I. Goldman et al., Stresses Affecting Surgical Performance and Learning:
Correlation of Heart Rate, Electrocardiogram and Operation Simultaneously Recorded on
Videotapes, 12 J. SURGICAL RES. 83, 84-85 (1972).
•. 3. N.J. Taffinder et al., Effect of Sleep Deprivation on Surgeons' Dexterity on Laparoscopy
Simulator, 352 LANCET 1191, 1191 (1998).
4. Teodor P. Grantcharov et al., Laparoscopic Performance After One Night on Call in a
Surgical Department: Prospective Study, 323 BRIT. MED. J. 1222, 1222-23 (2001).
5. Richard C. Friedman et al., The Intern and Sleep Loss, 285 NEw ENG. J. MED. 201, 202
(1971).
6. E.C. Poulton et al., The Performance of Junior Hospital Doctors Following Reduced Sleep
and Long Hours of Work, 21 ERGOMETRICS 279, 279 (1978).
VII:l1 (2007)
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residents results in a significant deterioration in reaction time,7 significant
impairment in cognitive function,8 and reduction in short-term recall.9 Another
study, focusing on internal medicine residents, found that increased total sleep
time resulted in twenty-five percent fewer medication errors.' 0 A more recent
study, which randomly assigned internal medicine interns working in intensive
care units to "traditional" (including twenty-four hour or more work shifts) and
"intervention" (no extended work shifts and fewer hours worked per week)
schedules, found that those on the traditional schedule made nearly forty percent
more serious medical errors than those on the intervention schedule and 5.6 times
more serious diagnostic errors."' Since sleepy residents could put patients at a
greater risk of injury or even death, and since many hospitals have not attempted
to remedy the problem on their own, some have argued that an external entity
should step in and regulate resident work hours in order to protect the safety of
patients. 12
B. Resident Health and Quality of Life
Others have argued that resident work hours should be regulated due to the
detrimental impact long hours and sleep deprivation may have on residents
themselves. Many studies have shown that working conditions have had negative
effects on residents' health. One study found a connection between sleep and
emotional health; surgical residents who experienced sleep loss were
significantly more likely to feel angry, confused, and fatigued.' 3 An additional
study reported that residents suffered from increased stress and depression.' 4 A
more recent study found that seventy-six percent of residents in an internal
medicine program suffered from a condition called "burnout," a condition
characterized by "depersonalization, emotional exhaustion, and a sense of low
7. D.I. Orton & J.H. Gruzelier, Adverse Changes in Mood and Cognition Performance of
House Officers After Night Duty, 298 BRIT. MED. J. 21, 22 (1989).
8. John Robbins & Fred Gottlieb, Sleep Deprivation and Cognitive Testing in Internal
Medicine House Staff, 12 W.J. MED. 82, 84-85 (1990).
9. Ian J. Deary & Rosemary Tait, Effects of Sleep Disruption on Cognitive Performance and
Mood in Medical House Officers, 295 BRIT. MED. J. 1513, 1514-15 (1987).
10. Daniel J. Gottlieb et al., Effect of a Change in Housestaff Work Schedule on Resource
Utilization and Patient Care, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2065, 2068 (1991).
11. Christopher P. Landrigan et al., Effect of Reducing Interns' Work Hours on Serious
Medical Errors in Intensive Care Units, 351 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1838, 1842-43 (2004).
12. See infra Section II.B.
13. Edward J. Bartle et al., The Effects ofAcute Sleep Deprivation During Residency Training,
104 SURGERY 311,314 (1988).
14. David B. Reuben, Psychologic Effects of Residency, 76 S. MED. J. 380 (1983).
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personal accomplishment."' 5 The authors hypothesized that burnout may also
contribute to "increases in cynicism and decreases in compassion."'
' 6
Evidence also shows that long hours may have a negative impact on the
physical health of residents. One study, for instance, found that sleep-deprived
residents suffered from greater complications during pregnancy, though this
difference lost significance when controlling for socio-economic status and
medical sophistication.17 In 1988,18 1996,'9 1997,20 and 1999,21 four authors
noted that residents suffering from sleep loss are at a significantly greater risk of
being in a motor vehicle accident. The most recent motor vehicle study,
published in 2005, reports that working extended shifts significantly increases the
risk that an intern will fall asleep while driving or while stopped in traffic, and
every extended work shift increases an intern's chance of being involved in a
motor vehicle accident during the commute from work by over sixteen percent.22
Several studies have shown that residents' social health and overall quality
of life is impaired due to long work hours. A 1993 study found that work hour
reductions increased resident satisfaction by allowing them to spend more time
with their families.2 3 Another study found that work hour limitations improved
the quality of residents' personal lives and relationships.24 A 2004 study that
compared a traditional system to a new (two shift) system found that residents'
spouses rated residents' abilities to attend family events significantly improved
15. Tait D. Shanafelt et al., Burnout and Self-Reported Patient Care in an Internal Medicine
Residency Program, 136 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 358, 358 (2002).
16. Id. at 366.
17. L.M. Osbom et al., Outcomes of Pregnancies Experienced During Residency, 31 J. FAM.
PRAC. 618 (1990).
18. James Robert Wendt & Lester J. Yen, The Resident by Moonlight: A Misguided Missile,
259 JAMA 43 (1988).
19. Carole L. Marcus & Gerald M. Loughlin, Effect of Sleep Deprivation on Driving Safety in
Housestaff, 19 SLEEP 763, 765 (1996).
20. R.T. Geer et al., Incidence of Automobile Accidents Involving Anesthesia Residents After
On-Call Duty Cycles, 87 ANESTHESIOLOGY A938 (1997).
21. Mark T. Steele et al., The Occupational Risk of Motor Vehicle Collisions for Emergency
Medicine Residents, 610 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1050, 1052 (1999).
22. Laura K. Barger et al., Extended Work Shifts and the Risk of Motor Vehicle Crashes Among
Interns, 352 NEw ENG. J. MED. 125, 125 (2005).
23. Joseph Conigliaro et al., Internal Medicine Housestaff and Attending Physician
Perceptions of the Impact of the New York State Section 405 Regulations on Working Conditions
and Supervision of Residents in Two Training Programs, 8 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 502, 505
(1993).
24. Amelia Kelly et al., The Effect of New York State Restrictions on Resident Work Hours, 78
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 468, 468 (1991).
VII:l1 (2007)
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after the change to the two shift system.25 Yet another recently published study
reports that there is a relationship between hours worked and a resident's
happiness and ability to take care of responsibilities outside of work.26
C. Residency Program Educational Quality
Still others have proposed that resident work hours be regulated in order to
improve the educational quality of residency programs. By reducing hours, some
believe that residents will benefit more from the hours they do spend at work. In
one experiment, where average work hours were reduced from 1 10 hours a week
to 75 hours a week, many residents felt that overall educational quality improved,
although faculty believed that, on average, there was no change. 7 Another study
found that work hour reductions allowed residents to have more time for reading
as well as for preparing for conferences and cases.28
Some, however, have argued that the largest gains in educational quality are
achieved when hours spent performing administrative or ancillary functions -
often referred to as "scut work" - are reduced.29 Several studies support this
claim. In one study, where health technicians were added to surgical teams,
resident work hours dropped from an average of 16.3 per weekday to 12.9 per
weekday; however, resident hours spent in the operating room increased from 3.3
hours per week to 9.8 hours per week.3°
Medical student and resident advocacy groups, such as the American
Medical Student Association, support work hour limits primarily to "protect
resident physicians from overwork, ' '31 although such organizations believe "an
25. The two shift system involved dividing residents into a day shift and a night shift. M.J.
Goldstein et al., A 360 Degrees Evaluation of a Night-Float System for General Surgery: A
Response to Mandated Work-Hours Reduction, 61 CURRENT SURGERY 445, 448 (2004).
26. Kara C. Kort et al., Resident Perceptions of the Impact of Work-Hour Restrictions on
Health Care Delivery and Surgical Education: Time for Transformational Change, 136 SURGERY
861, 864-65 (2004).
27. Kelly et al., supra note 24, at 470.
28. Chandrasekhar Bob Basu et al., The Effect of the Accreditation Council for Graduate
Medical Education Duty Hours Policy on Plastic Surgery Resident Education and Patient Care: An
Outcomes Study, 114 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 1878, 1881 (2004).
29. Some current and former residents despise "scut work" to such an extent that they
participate on interactive websites in order to inform prospective applicants about the amount of
"scut work" their programs require. See, e.g., Scutwork.com: Residency Program Reviews,
http://www.Scutwork.com.
30. Yale D. Podnos et al., Reducing the Noneducational and Nonclinical Workload of the
Surgical Resident: Defining the Role of the Health Technician, 60 CURRENT SURGERY 529, 530
(2003).
31. Am. Med. Student Ass'n, The Resident Work Hour Issue: Your Home for the Most Up-to-
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improved working environment" would also ensure patient safety.32 However,
most proponents of work hour regulations, such as patient rights organizations,
legislators, and the mass media, have placed a significantly greater emphasis on
the patient safety.33 Thus, every attempt to limit resident work hours was made
with that purpose in mind.34 The following Part provides a brief overview of the
history of graduate medical education and attempts to regulate it by both
government entities and the ACGME.
II. GRADUATE MEDICAL- EDUCATION: A BRIEF HISTORY
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services defines graduate
medical education as "the process for providing academic and clinical education
to physicians after they have, graduated from an accredited medical school.' 35
Medical school graduates enroll in these programs in order, to obtain advanced
training in a specialty area, such as surgery. 36 Such education typically takes
place at teaching hospitals, 37 often affiliated with medical schools,38 which allows
physician residents to provide patient care under the supervision of a teaching
physician.39 While program lengths vary by specialty, typical residencies last
from three to seven years.40
Formal residency programs have existed for almost 120 years.41 One can
divide the regulatory history of resident work hour limits into three distinct eras:
laissez-faire, New York State regulation, and ACGME self-regulation.
Date Information, http://www.amsa.org/rwh/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2006).
32. Id.
33. See infra Sections II.B-C (explaining why New York State and the ACGME ultimately
chose to regulate resident work hours).
34. See infra Sections II.B-C.
35. NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH WORKFORCE INFO. & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION AND PUBLIC POLICY: A PRIMER 1 (2000) [hereinafter
PRIMER].
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id. at 1.
38. More than ninety percent of all graduate medical education programs are affiliated with a
medical school. Id. at 3.
39. Id. at 2.
40. Stewart R. Reuter, Professional Liability in Postgraduate Medical Education, 15 J. LEGAL
MED. 485, 485-86 (1994).
41. See PRIMER, supra note 35, at 2 ("The first formal physician residency program... was
established at Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore in 1889.").
VIIl1 (2007)
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A. The Laissez-Faire Period: "The Bad Old Days"
The laissez-faire period spanned a century, from the first residency program
established at Johns Hopkins Hospital in 1889 to the creation of New York State
Department of Health regulations. The first half of the twentieth century marked
graduate medical education's formative years. By the early 1900s, other
institutions had already begun to create their own internship programs modeled
after the Johns Hopkins system.42 Although such programs "had become an
accepted part of preparation for general medical practice, 4 3 specialty training
beyond basic one-year internships was largely unregulated until the early 1930s,
when the American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS) began to provide
quality assurance by certifying specialists.4 4 Starting in the early 1970s, a similar
quality assurance function was performed by the Liaison Committee on Graduate
Medical Education, which then evolved into the ACGME in 1981 .45
Although some form of external oversight was present for much of this
period, one must distinguish between regulation of educational quality and
regulation of working conditions. The ACGME and its predecessor, while
generally encouraging hospitals to deemphasize "scut work" and maximize
educational value, made little or no attempt to intervene in the relationship
between a program and its residents.46
Residency programs, in the absence of outside regulations, were free to
determine resident physician working conditions as they saw fit. During this
period, a general consensus emerged that residents should work very long hours
as part of their training. Researchers continue to debate whether this consensus
was primarily motivated by economic or pedagogical reasons.4 7 There is little
doubt that hospitals receive significant economic benefits from their residency
programs - residents are an "elastic source of physician labor ' 48 and have been
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. Note that the ABMS did not accredit residency programs-it provided quality
assurance by testing individuals after they completed a residency program. For more information
on the certification procedure, see History of the ABMS, http://www.abms.org/AboutABMS/
who-we are.aspx (last visited Dec. 9, 2006).
45. PRIMER, supra note 35.
46. See generally Lindsay Evans, Note, Regulatory and Legislative Attempts at Limiting
Medical Resident Work Hours, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 251, 256-58 (2002) (discussing the ACGME's
stance on the resident work hour issue prior to its decision to regulate work hours itself).
47. See, e.g., Jennifer F. Whetsell, Changing the Law, Changing the Culture: Rethinking the
"Sleepy Resident" Problem, 12 ANNALs HEALTH L. 23, 43-50 (2003) (discussing why the medical
establishment has established and continues to support the traditional residency system).
48. David A. Asch & Ruth M. Parker, The Libby Zion Case: One Step Forward or Two Steps
7
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"regularly exploited as a source of inexpensive labor" from as early as the
1920s. 4 9 Even at the very best teaching hospitals, programs have been criticized
for using residents to perform a significant number of ancillary or administrative
functions that serve no educational purpose, such as drawing blood samples or
50transporting patients.
While economic incentives exist for hospitals to have their residents work
long hours, many have argued that such hours are also necessary for educational
purposes. There has been a widespread belief that new physicians must
experience a "round-the-clock trial by fire" as part of their training - an idea that
is still deeply entrenched to this day.51 Doctors have historically believed that
long working hours help residents to "learn to remain focused under taxing
,,52circumstances. According to these doctors, it is absolutely necessary for
residents to experience sleep deprivation and other hardships, for they must learn
to "subordinate their needs for sleep and food to the unpredictable and often
consuming demands of patient care. 53 As one doctor put it, "Patients get sick on
Christmas Day. Ditto 2 o'clock in the morning, and as a physician you need to be
able to take care of them. 54 Long hours also serve a psychological function, in
that they allow residents to solidify social identity and learn the humility
necessary to assume a powerful social role. 55 In other words, the medical
establishment believes mental and physical toughness is vital to the practice of
medicine, and graduate medical education programs "go to great lengths to test
these residents' and interns' mettle. 56
However, long hours did not develop as mere fraternity-like hazing rituals.
Backward?, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 771, 774 (1988).
49. Kenneth M. Ludmerer & Michael M. E. Johns, Reforming Graduate Medical Education,
294 JAMA 1083, 1084 (2005).
50. Id.
51. See Carl T. Hall, Doctors See Loopholes in Limits on Workweek, S.F. CHRON., June 16,.
2002, at A4.
52. Tom Pelton, New Rules on Residents Leave Hazy Prognosis for Hospitals, BALT. SUN.,
June 15, 2002, at l.A.
53. Sandra G. Boodman, Waking Up to the Problem of Fatigue Among Medical Interns, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2001, at S1.
54. See Peter C. Beller, Your Intern Today is Both Sleepy and Bored. Feel Better?, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at B9 (quoting Dr. James Rohack, former chairman of the American
Medical Association).
55. See Leanord C. Groopman, Medical Internship as Moral Education: An Essay on the
System of Training Physicians, 11 CULTURAL MED. & PSYCHIATRY 207, 207-27 (1987) (suggesting
that long hours are a rite of passage that promote group cohesion, establish social identity, and
further other psychological goals).
56. Whetsell, supra note 47, at 46.
VII:I1 (2007)
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Unlike other educational programs, where students can study the subject matter
outside of the physical educational institution, a medical resident's education
cannot be duplicated outside of the hospital setting - residents attempting to
specialize in surgery cannot simply go home and practice their surgical skills. In
order to obtain advanced clinical training in their specialty, residents have no
other option but to treat actual patients in an actual clinical setting, such as a
teaching hospital; thus, residents seeking to obtain as much training as possible
would often want to work longer hours to hone their skills.
57
Work hours, while universally long, still differed from program to program
during the laissez-faire period. The lack of regulation allowed different
specialties and sub-specialties to develop their own work hour norms over time.
Such norms were not arbitrary: They were highly correlated with the intensity of
the specialization. While residents in surgery often worked as many as 130 hours
a week, residents in other specialties have been known to work on average as
little as 60 or 70 hours per week.58 In other words, complicated and difficult to
master specialties demanded a greater time commitment from their residents than
specialties that require less technical skill on the part of the resident.59
B. New York State Regulation: A Failed Experiment
Although some individuals expressed their concern about medical resident
working hours during the laissez-faire period, no serious attempt was made to
change the status quo. This began to change in the mid-1980s, when the death of
an eighteen-year-old college freshman became the first step in a process that
would result in the State of New York regulating resident working hours, and
eventually brought about significant changes in graduate medical education
nationwide.
57. Myrle Croasdale, Beat the Clock: The New Challenges to Residents, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar.
8, 2004, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2004/03/08/prsaO308.htm.
58. Scott Turner, Medical Residency: An Exercise in Sleep Deprivation, GEORGE ST. J., Oct. 4,
2001, available at http://www.brown.edu/Administration/GeorgeStreetJournal/vo126/
26GSJ06h.html; cf Richard W. Schwartz et al., Controllable Lifestyle: A New Factor in Career
Choice by Medical Students, 64 ACAD. MED. 606 (1989) (discussing how some medical specialties
are known to have better lifestyles than others).
59. A recent survey by MercuryMD shows that this is true even today - residents in specialties
that involve the least amount of direct patient care, such as pathology and radiology, work between
twenty to forty fewer hours per week on average than residents in specialties that involve greater
patient care responsibilities, such as surgery and ob-gyn. MERCURYMD, IMPACT OF HOSPITAL
COMPUTER SYSTEMS ON RESIDENT WORK HOURS, http://www.medrecinst.com/uploadedFiles/
resources/venResearch/resident(1).pdf (last visited Dec. 9, 2006).
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1. The Desire To Regulate
The desire to transition from a free market system to state regulation was
based on the idea that allowing individual residency programs to set their own
work hour norms resulted in a market failure, for the free market system could
not properly handle the patient safety externality. 60 Residency programs sought to
train "tough" doctors whom the program could condition to become less
dependent on sleep and used to working long and unpredictable hours; 6 1
however, residents do not acquire these skills immediately, if they ever do.62
Since the typical residency programs provide residents with a very high degree of
patient care responsibility at a very early stage in the program,6 3 some argued that
residency programs, by requiring their residents to work very long hours, were
putting patients at risk by placing their care in the hands of sleep-deprived
residents. 64 The death of Libby Zion confirmed these assumptions.
2. The Libby Zion Incident
On the evening of March 4, 1984, Libby Zion was admitted to New York
Hospital with an earache and a 103 degree fever. 65 Although Libby's medical
team, consisting of two physically present residents and an attending physician
only available by phone,66 had been specifically told she was taking Nardil, an
anti-depressant, one of the residents prescribed an injection of Demerol, a drug
fatal when taken in conjunction with Nardil.67 Libby immediately began to suffer
an adverse reaction to Demerol. She thrashed about violently in bed and her fever
rose, but she was not seen by any doctor for about four hours. The only attention
she received was from attendants who restrained her on instructions from an
60. See supra Section I.A (discussing the potential impact long resident work hours may have
on patient safety).
61. See Boodman, supra note 53.
62. Studies have shown that, contrary to popular belief, healthy adults cannot acclimate to
sleep deprivation. See, e.g., Mark Blagrove et al., The Effects of Chronic Sleep Reduction on the
Performance of Cognitive Tasks Sensitive to Sleep Deprivation, 9 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 21
(1994); Mary A. Carskadon & William C. Dement, Cumulative Effects of Sleep Restriction on
Daytime Sleepiness, 18 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 107 (1981); David F. Dinges et al., Cumulative
Sleepiness, Mood Disturbance, and Psychomotor Vigilance Performance Decrements During a
Week of Sleep Restricted to 4-5 Hours Per Night, 20 SLEEP 267 (1997).
63. PRIMER, supra note 35, at 2.
64. See supra Section I.A (discussing how sleepy residents may impair patient safety).
65. Tom Wicker, Doctors in the Dock?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1985, at A17.
66. Craig Horowitz, The Doctor Is Out, N.Y. MAG., Nov. 3, 2003, available at
http://newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/health/features/n_9426/index2.html.
67. Wicker, supra note 65.
VII:l1 (2007)
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intern who had never examined her.68 By morning, Libby had passed away.
69
Sidney Zion, Libby's father and a former prosecutor and New York Times
journalist, hired attorneys to investigate his daughter's death and was shocked to
discover that both residents had been working at the hospital for eighteen hours
or more by the time they sa~v Libby.70 Rather than merely suing the hospital for
malpractice, Sidney Zion decided to use his influence to draw attention to the
poor care patients may receive due to overworked and fatigued residents;71 he
successfully lobbied for a grand jury investigation of New York Hospital's
residency program.72 Although the grand jury did not issue any criminal
indictments, it did provide several recommendations to improve patient care,
including placing limits on medical resident working hours.73 In 1987, the New
York State Commissioner of Health appointed a committee, chaired by Dr.
Bertrand Bell, to examine the grand jury's findings.74 This committee, dubbed
the Bell Commission, recommended substantial changes to graduate medical
education, most notably that the state government place limits on resident
working hours.75
3. State Regulation: Implementation and Enforcement
New York adopted many of the Bell Commission's recommendations in
1988, making New York the first state to regulate resident working hours.76
These regulations, which Went into effect in July. 1989 and are still in effect
today, limit residents to an eighty-hour workweek (averaged over a four-week
period). 77 In addition, residents cannot work more than twenty-four consecutive
hours of scheduled work (twelve hours in emergency departments) and are
required to receive at least eight hours between these work assignments.
78
Furthermore, residents must receive a minimum of twenty-four nonworking
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Horowitz, supra note 66.
71. Wicker, supra note 65.
72. Id.




76. Don Colburn, Young Doctor's Lack of Sleep Doesn't Affect Care, WASH. POST, Sept. 27,
1988, at Z5.
77. Steinbrock, supra note 73.
78. Id.
11
Ciolli: The Medical Resident Working Hours Debate
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2007
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
hours every week.79
At the time these regulations were adopted, many believed that other states
would soon follow New York's lead and implement their own regulations."0
However, this never came to pass; even today, New York remains the only state
to have instituted limits on resident work hours. Although four states -
California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania - have contemplated
similar regulations, their bills never passed.8'
The New York regulations, once warmly embraced and originally inspiring
much optimism, soon became regarded as a failure due to hospitals largely
ignoring the regulations. In 1989, the year the regulations went into effect, sixty-
two percent of New York hospitals failed to comply with at least one major
provision; in 1991 this figure rose to seventy-one percent. By 1994 a full ninety-
two percent of hospitals were in non-compliance with the regulations.8 2 Three
factors largely explain why non-compliance rates reached such high levels.
a. Enforcement
Perhaps the most obvious reason for lack of compliance with the New York
regulations was the State's inability to effectively enforce them. First, New
York's monitoring mechanisms were weak. When the regulations first went into
effect in 1989, New York's Department of Health visited thirty New York City
hospitals in order to assure their compliance with the new regulations.83
However, in 1993, this number dropped to only twelve visits. 84 Insufficient
funding likely caused this low level of monitoring; although the Department of
Health was given the additional duty of enforcing these regulations, its budget
was cut by both the New York State and New York City governments.85 Given
the Department's other responsibilities, it should come as no surprise that the
Department of Health did not view enforcing resident work hour regulations as a
86top priority.
Second, this insufficient monitoring was coupled with low penalties.
Hospitals found to have violated the regulations face only a $2000 fine for the
79. Id.
80. Whetsell, supra note 47, at 55.
81. See Boodman, supra note 53; Ann Japenga, Endless Days and Sleepless Nights: Do Long
Work Schedules Help or Hinder Medical Residents?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1988 at 1.
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first violation.87 Given the very low risk of getting caught, and the very small
penalty if one does get caught, it is not unexpected that hospitals would not place
a high priority on compliance.
b. Financing
Although New York did not effectively enforce the regulations, this lack of
enforcement alone does not explain why most New York hospitals chose not to
comply. While enforcement of the regulations has been weak overall, there have
been periods when New York did cite a large number of hospitals for violations.
For instance, New York's Department of Health conducted a series of raids in
March 1998, which uncovered numerous violations at several prestigious
teaching hospitals; 88 a similar raid took place in 2002, uncovering even more
violations.89
Rather than reacting to such raids by increasing compliance with the
regulations, hospitals chose to take creative measures to avoid getting caught
violating them. One hospital, for example, generated two separate schedules for
residents - one for clinic duties and another for in-patient duties - that were not
reconciled. 90 Another hospital sought to circumvent the regulations by officially
scheduling residents for twelve-hour shifts in compliance with the regulations but
making it clear that they were actually required to arrive an hour or two before
the official starting time and expected to stay after the official ending time. 91
Even more hospitals would schedule "technically optional" conferences that
would not be included in the official work schedule, but require residents to
attend.92
Why would hospitals take such elaborate steps in order to avoid complying
with the law? Hospitals have an obvious financial incentive not to comply with
these regulations: If complying with the regulations would reduce a surgical
resident's average work week from 130 hours to 80 hours, the hospital would
have to hire other individuals to make up for the 50 hour deficit. The costs of
hiring additional staff are substantial. Hiring just one additional physician
87. Susan Rubinowitz, Hosp Docs No Longer the Young and the Rest-less, N.Y. POST, Jan. 26,
2000, at 18.
88. Lucette Lagnado, Raid of Hospitals Probes Overworked Doctors, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11,
1998, at B 1.
89. Margaret Ramirez, City Teaching Hospitals Broke Rules on Hours for Residents,
NEWSDAY, June 27, 2002, at A49.
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assistant may cost a hospital anywhere from $67,000 to $77,000 per year, and an
additional nurse practitioner's salary could range from $53,000 to $98,000.9'
More skilled laborers, such as specialized physicians known as "hospitalists,"
have salaries ranging from $100,000 to $150,000. 9 4 At some hospitals, the costs
of hiring additional staff to compensate for lost resident labor can exceed $5
million per year. 95
One should note that the New York regulations were not a completely
unfunded mandate: New York State gave 'hospitals, $55 million a year to help
comply with them.96 However, this money did not sufficiently cover the
increased expense; the New York Department of Health estimated the initial cost
of compliance at $227 million, with continued compliance costing $3.1 billion
for the first ten years and $5.7 billion over the first fifteen years. 97 Not only was
$55 million a year insufficient, but hospitals had no guarantee that the state
would perpetually provide them with. $55 million a year. Furthermore, since
hospitals were not required to account for how they spent the money,98 hospitals
seeking to maximize their economic position could spend this money on other
things and continue not to comply with the regulations, considering the low
levels of enforcement and low penalties.
c. Culture
While financial incentives played a very large role in hospital non-
compliance with the New York regulations, one cannot ignore the role of culture.
As discussed earlier, doctors have historically believed that residents should
work long hours for a variety of reasons, ranging from pedagogical99 to
psychological.' 00 It should come as no surprise that a culture so entrenched would
not change overnight.
Additional cultural factors, however, likely contributed to hospitals'
unwillingness to comply. Hospitals have historically been given a significant
amount of deference, and for the most part they have been allowed to set their
93. Debra F. Weinstein, Duty Hours for Resident Physicians - Tough Choices for Teaching
Hospitals, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1275, 1276 (2002).
94. Bruce Japsen, Residents Rules Cost Hospitals Millions, CHI. TRIB., July 10, 2005, at CI.
95. Katherine Vogt, Hospitals Count Up Cost of Reduced Resident Hours, AM. MED. NEWS,
Aug. 11, 2003, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2003/08/11 /bisc081 1.htm.
96. Ronches, supra note 82.
97. GAO, HEALTH CARE: REDUCTION IN RESIDENT PHYSICIAN WORK HOURS WILL NOT BE
EASY To ATTAIN 4 (1992) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]:.
98. See Ronches, supra note 82.
99. Pelton, supra note 52.
100. Groopman, supra note 55.
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own standards; thus, hospitals have generally been suspicious of government
interference in their affairs. 0 1 Since "regulations may be crafted by legislators
who lack intimate knowledge of the health care system," hospitals are reluctant
to blindly follow government mandates without solid evidence that such
regulations are truly beneficial and necessary.10 2 Hospitals did not believe that the
New York state government provided solid evidence. In fact, even today many
hospitals and residency program directors argue that there is no relationship
between work hour limits and. patient safety. 10 3 Doctors in other states oppose
state work hour legislation for similar reasons and believed hospital
administrators, and not the government, should make these decisions. 
104
C. The Current State of Affairs: A CGME Regulation
When state regulation of resident work hours failed to meet expectations,
some believed that residency programs simply would not submit to any form of
external regulation of resident working conditions. The early twenty-first
century, however, has seen a significant change in how resident work hours are
regulated. On June 11, 2002, the ACGME announced that, as of July 1, 2003, all
accredited residency programs would have to comply with the ACGME's
resident work hour regulations in order to keep their accreditation.'
1 05
While New York State resident work hour regulations stemmed from the
Libby Zion incident, there was no single event that precipitated the ACGME's
decision to regulate nationwide. Public outcry, in fact, played little, if any, role in
the ACGME's decision. Instead, the ACGME was likely motivated by a series of
events that, while receiving significantly less media attention than Libby Zion,
posed a real threat to both hospital and ACGME control over residency
programs.
101. Robert Trowbridge & Robert M. Wachter, Legislation, Accreditation, and Market-Driven
and Other Approaches to Improving Patient Safety in MAKING HEALTH CARE SAFER: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF PATIENT SAFETY PRACTICES 601, 602 (Amy J. Markowitz ed., 2001), available at
http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/ptsafety/pdf/ptsafety.pdf
102. Id.
103. See infra Section III.C (discussing why many hospitals and residency program directors
believe limiting resident work hours does not enhance patient safety).
104. See, e.g., David Abel, Bill Would Put Federal Limit on Residents' Marathon Hours, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 31, 2001, at J3 ("'I think legislation is a dangerous way to go when we are trying to
provide the best training,' said Elizabeth Stengel, director of the Conference of Boston Teaching
Hospitals. 'It doesn't allow flexibility and its just much better that doctors and hospital
administrators make the decisions."').
105. Hall, supra note 51.
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1. Resident Unionization
Hospitals have historically been identified as organizations that "are most
supportive of steep hierarchies in which junior staff do not question senior
staff."10 6 This hierarchical nature certainly applies to residencies, for the purpose
of a residency program is for a resident to acquire training in a specialty area by
supervising physicians who are already skilled specialists in their fields.'0 7
However, a ruling by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in 1999 had
the potential to change fundamentally the relationship between residents and their
superiors.
The controversy in Boston Medical Center Corp. 108 began with the merger of
Boston City Hospital, a public hospital, and Boston University Medical Center
Hospital, a private hospital, to create the Boston Medical Center, a private
entity. 09 Due to Massachusetts's Public Employee Benefits Act, residents at
Boston City Hospital had been unionized since 1969, while the Boston
University Medical Center Hospital had not recognized a resident union."0
Although the Boston Medical Center was required to recognize Boston City
Hospital's union as a condition of the merger, the residents' union, the
Committee of Interns and Residents, brought the case before the NLRB in order
to test whether residents at private institutions are primarily students or
employees.' 11
The NLRB, in a split decision, reversed more than twenty years of
precedent." 2 The majority found that residents, "while they may be students
learning their chosen medical craft, are also 'employees' within the meaning of
Section 2(3) of the [National Labor Relations] Act."' 1 3 Under this decision,
medical residents were given all the rights given to other workers protected under
the NLRA, including the ability to bargain collectively and strike.14
The Boston Medical Center ruling drew immediate criticism from several
prominent medical professional organizations, which saw the decision as a threat
106. Trowbridge & Wachter, supra note 101.
107. PRIMER, supra note 35, at 2.
108. 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Am. Ass'n of Med. Coils., Resident Unionization, http://www.aamc.org/advocacy/
library/workforce/workOO03.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
112. See, e.g., St. Clare's Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977); Cedars-Sinai Med.
Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976) (holding that medical residents are primarily students, not
employees).
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to medical education's traditional hierarchical structure. The Association of
American Medical Colleges (AAMC) issued a statement condemning the
decision, stating that the decision "has far-ranging, potentially damaging
implications for the future of physician training in this country." ' 5 The AAMC's
president, Jordan J. Cohen, went on to say that labor disputes and other issues
arising out of medical education programs "should be the responsibility of the
faculty and teaching institution," and that "residents should not have the right to
strike and that the ability to do so, which is one of the primary entitlements
associated with unions, is incompatible with the medical education process."
' 16
The ACGME, while not condemning the NLRB's decision outright, issued a
statement affirming its ability to regulate resident working environments. In this
statement, which was circulated to all residents, the ACGME emphasized that
"[r]esidents are first and foremost students, rather than employees, and all
accreditation standards and activities reflect this distinction."' '7
2. Federal Government Regulation
Resident unionization was not the only potential threat to hospital and
ACGME control over residency programs nationwide. Not long after the NLRB
decided the Boston Medical Center case, some individuals within the U.S.
government contemplated federal regulation of resident working conditions.
The early twenty-first century was not the first time the federal government
considered the possibility of regulating resident work hours. In fact, the U.S.
government first considered the possibility in 1991, three years after the New
York State regulations were instituted. Illinois Congressman Marty Russo,
contemplating federal resident work hour legislation, asked the Human
Resources Division of the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) to investigate
whether the "quality of care delivered by resident physicians could be improved"
through federal legislation limiting resident work hours. 18 GAO, after a yearlong
study, concluded that residents who work long hours with minimal supervision
"are likely to be more at risk of making errors than are properly rested and
supervised personnel." ' 19 However, the GAO report found that federal legislation
115. Press Release, Am. Ass'n of Med. Coils., AAMC Statement on NLRB Boston Medical
Center Ruling (Dec. 8, 1999), available at http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/pressrel/1999/
991130.htm.
116. Id.
117. Memorandum from David C. Leach, Executive Director, ACGME, to Member
Organizations of the ACGME (Mar. 1, 2000), available at http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/
reviewComment/revresidentEmployee.asp.
118. GAO REPORT, supra note 97, at 1.
119. Id. atS.
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may not succeed in resolving the problem, since many hospitals, particularly
those in inner cities, would not limit work hours unless the costs of compliance
were fully reimbursed.120 After receiving this report, Congressman Russo did not
introduce a bill seeking to limit resident work hours.
For the next decade, the federal government made no significant attempt to
regulate work hours. In April 2001, however, the Committee of Interns and
Residents, an affiliate of the Service Employees International Union,' 2' joined by
the American Medical Student Association and the Public Citizen Health
Research Group, petitioned the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) to "enforce a federal work hour standard for residents."'' 22 OSHA stated
that it did not believe it had the purview to regulate resident work hours.
123
Although this petition was unsuccessful, it got the attention of Michigan
Congressman John Conyers, Jr., who introduced the Patient and Physician Safety
and Protection Act, H.R. 3236, in November 200.124 This bill would have
limited residents to eighty hours of work per week and would not have permitted
averaging of weeks. 
25
Shortly before H.R. 3236 was formally introduced, the AAMC, in an attempt
to eliminate the need for federal legislation, changed its position on the resident
work hour issue and recommended that "in no case should residents be scheduled
to be on duty more than 80 hours a week."'' 26 While this declaration was not
binding on any residency program, the AAMC cited it as evidence that
government intervention was not necessary. In a letter to Congressman Conyers,
AAMC President Jordan J. Cohen wrote that the AAMC "agree[d] that the issues
addressed in this legislation are very important" but felt that legislation was not
appropriate, since "[t]he mechanisms that are in place in the private sector to
safeguard the public's interest in these matters have evolved over decades" and
"the academic medical community ... ha[d] already made substantial progress in
dealing with current concerns about resident and patient well being."'' 27 Cohen
concluded the letter by arguing that "continued reliance on these proven
120. Id.
121. Comm. of Interns & Residents, Who We Are, http://www.cirseiu.org/ourlocalU (last visited
Oct. 17, 2006).
122. Robert Steinbrook, The Debate Over Residents' Work Hours, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1296,
1297 (2002).
123. Jay Greene, Petition Asks OSHA To Limit Resident Work Hours, AM. MED. NEWS, May 21,
2001, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2001/05/21/prsa0521 .htm.
124. H.R. 3236, 107th Cong. (2001).
125. See Steinbrook, supra note 122, at 1296.
126. Id. at 1297.
127. Letter from Jordan J. Cohen, AAMC President, to John Conyers, Jr., U.S. Representative
(Jan. 4, 2002), available at http://www.aamc.org/advocacy/library/educ/corres/2002/010402.htm.
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mechanisms offers a far greater likelihood of success in dealing with the
concerns addressed by H.R. 3236 than does the introduction of legislative and
regulatory strictures into the complex environment of graduate medical
education.0
28
When it became clear Congressman Conyers had no intention of
withdrawing the bill, and that New Jersey Senator Jon Corzine also intended to
introduce the bill in the Senate (as S. 2614), the ACGME decided to place formal
limits on resident work hours at ACGME-accredited residency programs.1 29 On
June 11, 2002, the day before Senator Corzine introduced S. 2614, the ACGME
announced that, effective July 1, 2003, residents could be scheduled for no more
than eighty duty hours per week, averaged over four weeks, with provisions
allowing for increases in certain circumstances.130 Neither H.R. 3236 nor S. 2614
received a vote from, their respective houses of Congress, and when
Representative Conyers reintroduced his bill as H.R. 1228 the following year it
also failed to receive a vote.
131
III. EVALUATING EXISTING REGULATORY SCHEMES
Academics and practitioners have generally identified three possible ways to
regulate resident working hours and conditions: public decentralized regulation,
public centralized regulation, and private centralized regulation. This Part
discusses the costs and benefits of these regulatory systems relative to an
unregulated market.
A. No Regulation: The Free Market
The laissez-faire period in graduate medical education was an era of a free
market, in which residency programs themselves were able to determine resident
working hours and conditions without external oversight. 132 As discussed earlier,
this free market system led to inefficient outcomes due to its inability to handle
externalities, such as the medical mistakes that led to the deaths of Libby Zion
128. Id.
129. See Michael Romano, Hours of Doctors-in-Training: Who's Counting?, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Aug. 19, 2002, at 18 (quoting Peter Lurie, deputy director of the Public Citizen
advocacy group, who called the ACGME regulations "a last-gasp effort to save off federal
legislation").
130. Steinbrook, supra note 122.
131. Am. Ass'n of Med. Colls, Washington Highlights: April 1, 2005, http://www.aamc.org/
advocacy/library/washhigh/2005/040105/start.htm (last visited Dec. 8, 2006) (see subheading
Conyers Reintroduces Resident Hours Legislation).
132. See supra Section II.A (summarizing the laissez-faire period).
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and others. 133 Though some residency program directors may prefer such a
system and wish to return to such an era, such a change is unlikely to occur since
other stakeholders in graduate medical education are no longer willing to
potentially compromise patient safety.
134
In recent years, however, some have proposed an alternate free market
approach involving a shift in bargaining power. Rather than allowing individual
residency programs to unilaterally determine working hour policies, residency
programs would decide these policies together with residents themselves.1
35
There is little dispute that economics played at least some role in shaping
working hour policies during the laissez-faire period: Since residents provided
hospitals with a cheap source of labor, hospitals had an incentive to require their
residents to perform ancillary tasks that were unrelated to the educational goals
of a residency program. 136 Residents lacked any semblance of bargaining power
and could not prevent programs from assigning them to such tasks.'37
The NLRB's 1999 decision in Boston Medical Center,138 granting medical
residents at private institutions the right to unionize, could allow medical
residents, through their unions, to negotiate working hours and conditions as part
of a collective bargaining agreement. There are clear advantages to such a
system. Since residents receive minimal benefit from "scut work" and greatly
prefer tasks that further education in their specialty, it is likely that meaningful
negotiation between programs and residents would result in a reduction of hours
performing "scut work" without a reduction in hours spent on training. As a
result, residents might work fewer hours and eliminate or lessen the externality,
while simultaneously not compromising their educational training. Furthermore,
hospitals and residents could implement work hour regulations that are
individually tailored to specific programs within specific institutions.
Although this new spin on free market regulation seems like the ideal
solution, in practice it is highly unlikely to result in any meaningful reforms.
First, it is doubtful that a critical mass of medical residents will ever become
unionized. Unlike steelworkers or teachers, no individuals are medical residents
133. See supra Section II.B (summarizing the shift from the laissez-faire system to state
regulation).
134. See supra Sections II.B-C (explaining why the government and other stakeholders will no
longer tolerate a lack of regulation).
135. See Jason van Steenburgh, Under Pressure, Medicine Revisits Resident Work Hours, ACP-
ASIM OBSERVER, Mar. 2002, available at http://www.acponline.org/journals/news/mar02/
resident.htm (stating that some organizations have attempted to work with residents to negotiate
working conditions directly with hospitals).
136. Ludmerer & Johns, supra note 49, at 1084.
137. Id.
138. 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999).
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for their entire professional lives; all medical school students applying for
resident positions know that their residencies are temporary positions that will
only last for a certain number of years before they can move on to more lucrative
opportunities of their own choosing. As a result, there is little incentive for
medical residents to organize, particularly when the residents leading the
organizing effort are unlikely to reap the benefits of unionization themselves,
since the union recognition and collective bargaining process can take years. 139
While some might argue that the temporary nature of teaching assistant
positions has not prevented graduate students from pursuing unionization, the
situations are not analogous. Medical resident salaries are virtually identical from
program to program, and other points of contention, such as work hours, do not
vary much among programs within a given specialty. 140 Since medical residents
at a given program or hospital are unlikely to believe they are worse off relative
to their peers elsewhere,' 41 there is substantially less need for a union. The fact
that only a small handful of medical residents have even attempted to unionize
since the 1999 NLRB decision casts further doubt on this theory.
142
Furthermore, the free market would be unlikely to create meaningful
changes even if there were widespread demand among medical residents for
unionization. The very high incidence of non-compliance with New York State's
medical resident regulations as late as the 1990s shows that hospitals are not
above ignoring laws if the benefits of non-compliance are significantly higher
than the costs of compliance. Although American labor law provides certain
protections to workers who are trying to organize, the procedure and remedies for
enforcing these protections under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) are
extremely weak. The process involves first filing a complaint with an NLRB
office claiming the statute was violated, waiting for that office to investigate the
allegation and issue a complaint, and then bringing a case before an
139. Guaranteeing Employee Free Choice Through Democratic "Card-Check" Procedures,
http://www.wslc.org/photos/temp/EFCA-cardcheck.doc (last visited Dec. 9, 2006).
140. PRIMER, supra note 35, at 6, 13; Neil A. Lewis, Medical Establishment Turns to Powerful
Allies To Thwart Residents'Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2003, at A10.
141. Studies show that an individual's psychological feelings toward issues such as pay will
differ based on how other individuals he or she knows about are treated. For instance, studies have
found that employees who work at organizations with two-tier wage structures, where new
employees are paid less than current employees even though they perform the exact same work, are
highly dissatisfied and significantly more likely to quit, since the wage differentials are viewed as
very unfair. See JERALD GREENBERG & ROBERT A. BARON, BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS 147
(2000). Similarly, when individuals know that employees at other organizations are paid more
money for the same work, they are also more likely to feel resentful and take action to end the
perceived inequality. Id.
142. Am. Ass'n of Med. Coils., Resident Unionization, supra note 111.
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administrative law judge who may make non-binding recommendations. If the
parties disagree, the matter is heard by the five members of the NLRB, which,
while having the power to make an actual decision, does not have the power to
compel either party to comply it. 143 For an NLRB decision to have binding
impact on the parties, it must be -affirmed by a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
This is an extremely long process, and it is certainly not uncommon for many
years, and in some cases even decades, to pass from the time the unfair labor
practice took place to the time an appellate court renders a binding decision.
44
Furthermore, even if the appellate court affirms a decision against the employer,
the employee can only receive back pay (or reinstatement) as compensation and
never punitive damages. 45 Given that widespread medical resident unionization
has the potential to cost hospitals millions, and given that few residents would
have the resources or desire to commence litigation that has the potential to last
longer than their entire residency program, it is highly unlikely that a meaningful
number of medical resident unions would ever get certified even if most residents
wanted to unionize. Barring radical changes in American labor law, free market
regulation with resident union input is unlikely to happen.
It is also incorrect to assume that medical resident unions would properly
handle the patient safety externality. Residents and patients do not share the same
interests. A medical resident union, like other unions, would view furthering its
own members' interests as its primary goal. In this case, furthering member
interests would likely involve improving resident quality of life and enhancing
the educational value of residency programs; if one believes these should be the
primary goals of resident work hour regulation, resident unionization may be an
acceptable solution. However, if increasing patient safety takes precedence over
those other goals, the misalignment of patient and resident interests would make
unionization an ineffective means of achieving this greater goal.
While some may argue that furthering some resident goals may also further
the interests of patients, there is no guarantee that this would actually transpire.
For example, rather than demanding fewer hours through the elimination of "scut
work," a medical resident union might ask that total work hours remain the same,
but conferences and other educational activities replace hours that were
previously used to perform ancillary functions. Alternatively, residents might not
ask for changes in working conditions at all, and just negotiate for large salary
increases, so that residents are paid on par with physician assistants, nurse
practitioners, and other hospital personnel who perform some of the same duties
as residents.
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Although fewer hours will likely increase a resident's quality of life,
residents may not want to work fewer hours. Residents enroll in residency
programs in order to obtain training in a specialty; a decrease in total work hours,
even if geared toward reducing "scut work" hours, could conceivably result in
residents obtaining less training than under a system where work hours are not
restricted. Residents may fear that residency programs might become extended to
make up for this difference. 146 Since residents must already go through four years
of college and an additional four years of medical school as well as their
relatively low-paying residency before they can obtain higher paying jobs, many
residents may not accept a higher quality of life during residency if it means
delaying entry into lucrative jobs by one or two more years.
Even if residents did successfully negotiate fewer hours, there is no
guarantee that residents would use this extra time to get more sleep. One study,
for instance, found that residents given "protected time," during which they were
not on call, did not use their free time to sleep, but instead to engage in other
activities. In fact, they averaged the same amount of sleep as residents who did
not have the extra free time. 147 Thus, while fewer hours may result in higher
resident quality of life, they may not further the objective of patient safety if
residents do not use their additional free time to get more rest.
B. Public Decentralized Regulation
New York State experimented with public decentralized regulation of
residency programs starting in 1989, when it implemented the Bell
Regulations. 48 Originally, many individuals believed other states would join
New York in passing their own resident work hour regulations. Those favoring
state regulation argued that, as Justice Brandeis observed in his famous dissent in
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,149 each individual state would "serve as a
laboratory" and "try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country."1 50 Of course, this did not take place: Other states did not
create their own version of the Bell Regulations, 151 and New York itself did a
146. See, e.g., Croasdale, supra note 57 ("One [resident] is convinced that the [ACGME work
hour] rules eventually will mean an extension in the length of training programs because studies
show that the more procedures performed the better the doctor becomes at them.").
147. G.S. Richardson et al., Objective Assessment of Sleep and Alertness in Medical House Staff
and the Impact of Protected Time for Sleep, 19 SLEEP 718 (1996).
148. Colburn, supra note 76.
149. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
150. Id. at311.
151. Boodman, supra note 53.
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very poor job enforcing them.
1 52
One should not interpret the failure of public decentralized regulation as a
sign that it is not possible to experiment with novel approaches to resident work
hour regulation. While public decentralized regulation suffers from several key
flaws, these problems are not due to decentralization. Rather, the problems that
prevented the success of public decentralized regulation stem from the
government's involvement in both implementing and enforcing the regulations.
State governments are made up of politicians; as much as we might wish for
elected officials not to consider politics when setting legislative priorities, in
reality, politicians simply cannot afford not to take political considerations into
account when deciding what bills they should support. Many people consider
health care in general as a high priority and demand that politicians improve both
state and national health care services; however, some health care issues are
considered significantly more important than others. While many voters care
about issues such as affordable health insurance, few voters may even be aware
that long resident work hours may compromise patient safety.
Although few voters consider resident work hour regulation a major issue,
doctors and medical organizations have very strong opinions on the issue, and are
willing to express their opinions. For example, California's attempt at regulating
resident work hours was defeated due to opposition from the California Medical
Association and the California Association of Hospitals and Health Systems.
53
Given the strength of the medical profession's lobbying abilities, the traditional
deference given to professional organizations, and the fact that voters generally
do not see this as a high priority issue, it is not surprising that politicians have
largely been unwilling to push for state regulation of resident work hours.
Some would argue that this problem is not insurmountable; for instance,
resident work hour regulations were implemented in New York State. However,
one must examine what caused New York to implement these regulations.
Clearly, media coverage of the Libby Zion incident increased public awareness
of the resident fatigue problem1 54 and caused the public to demand action. But
what is it about the Libby Zion incident that attracted so much media attention?
Libby Zion was not the first New Yorker to die due to a mistake made by a
medical resident, nor was she the last. Although Libby, as an eighteen-year-old
college freshman, appears a sympathetic victim, other sympathetic individuals
have died under similar circumstances in other states. For instance, Taylor
McCormack, a thirteen-month-old baby, died in 2000 when residents at Boston's
152. Ronches, supra note 82.
153. Japenga, supra note 81.




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol7/iss1/5
THE MEDICAL RESIDENT WORKING HOURS DEBATE
Children's Hospital mistakenly placed her in a non-intensive-care room and
postponed her surgery;155 the year before, William Katcher, a twenty-two-week-
old baby, almost died at the same hospital due to residents failing to provide a
breathing tube.
156
Despite these shocking incidents, there was no public outcry for
Massachusetts to implement resident work hour limits as there had been in New
York after Libby Zion's death. 57 One needs to consider the differences between
these victims. Libby Zion's father, Sidney Zion, was a well-connected lawyer
and journalist.158 Through his connections, Sidney Zion was able to draw
substantial media attention to his daughter's death that otherwise would not have
existed. In contrast, the families of William Katcher and Taylor McCormack
were not as well connected, and therefore they did not receive the extensive
media coverage or the criminal investigations that might have generated the
public outcry necessary to push a bill through the Massachusetts legislature. One
must acknowledge, therefore, that the New York situation was truly unique, and
that it is not likely that similar situations will manifest themselves in a significant
number of other states.
However, even Sidney Zion was not able to keep resident fatigue and patient
safety in the headlines forever. Just as politicians do not possess an unlimited
amount of political capital, government agencies do not possess unlimited
budgets, and they must make trade-offs when deciding how to spend their
money. As Libby Zion faded away and resident work hours moved out of the
public's consciousness, New York's Department of Health, facing substantial
budget cuts, no longer viewed enforcement of its resident work hour regulations
as a high priority, 159 and, with the exception of New York City Public Advocate
Mark Green, elected officials saw no need to remedy the situation.
60
Furthermore, government officials do not possess the same expertise and
knowledge of the health care industry as do doctors and other medical
professionals. Elected officials, even if well intentioned, are at a higher risk of
155. Anne Barnard, Teaching Hospitals' Dilemma: Instruction vs. Care for Harried Residents,
Duties Not Clear-Cut, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 10, 2001, at B 1.
156. Id.
157. Although these incidents received some media coverage, it paled in comparison to
coverage of Libby Zion's death, and this limited amount of media attention did not lead to state
regulation of resident work hours in Massachusetts. Abel, supra note 104.
158. Horowitz, supra note 66.
159. See supra Sub-section II.B.2 (discussing New York's inability to enforce its regulations).
160. See Horowitz, supra note 66 ("However, in 1997, then-public advocate Mark Green
released a report that exposed the defiance on the part of the hospitals and embarrassed the state
Health Department. Since then, the state has cracked down with serious financial penalties for
hospitals that don't comply.").
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instituting regulations that do little or nothing to solve the underlying problem
than educated professionals who have a better understanding of the industry and
its operations. 1
61
C. Private Centralized Regulation
Private centralized regulation involves regulation by a non-governmental
entity whose regulations have a national reach. Since July 2003, resident work
hours have been regulated by the ACGME, a private centralized regulating
entity. Unlike New York State, the ACGME has not had difficulty enforcing its
regulations. As a private organization whose sole purpose is to evaluate and
accredit residency programs, the ACGME has not had to make tradeoffs between
enforcing its work hour regulations and other functions. Unlike a state
Department of Health or other governmental entity, the ACGME's functions are
highly interrelated and enforcing work hour regulations would not take a
significant amount of time or money away from its other duties;162 thus,
entrusting the ACGME with resident work hour regulation duties would naturally
result in more efficient outcomes.
163
1. Implementation and Enforcement
The ACGME work hour regulations met with significant skepticism.64 As a
private organization, the ACGME lacks many of the attributes of government
entities. Most notably, the ACGME does not have access to taxpayer money.
Although New York State's $55 million a year subsidy could cover only a
fraction of the costs of compliance with its work hour regulations, the ACGME
161. Of course, this does not mean that private organizations are not also at risk of instituting
bad regulations. See supra Section II.C (discussing the problems with the ACGME work hour
regulations).
162. There are many parallels between the ACGME's primary role of assessing the quality of
residency programs and its secondary role of enforcing work hour regulations. For example, since
the ACGME already routinely conducts more than 1900 site visits every year to ensure compliance
with its other regulations, it should pose no hardship for the ACGME to measure compliance to its
work hour regulations during these visits. See Accreditation Council for Graduate Med. Educ., The
Role of the ACGME, http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/about/ab-roleACGME.asp (last visited
Dec. 9, 2006) (discussing the role of the ACGME).
163. Of course, if state governments took over the ACGME's accreditation function in addition
to regulating work hours, they could also benefit from this; however, all the other problems of
public decentralized regulation discussed earlier would still apply.
164. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 51 ("Out on the hospital floor, however, many physicians in
training said they doubt much will change, citing a hoary tradition of absurd hours for novice
doctors as well as their own shockingly low salaries.").
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regulations were a true unfunded mandate. Even if it wanted to, the ACGME
could not cover the full costs of hospital compliance with its regulations.
Therefore, some speculated that hospitals would ignore the ACGME regulations
much as they did the New York regulations. 165
While some residency programs did initially fail to comply with the
ACGME regulations, the overwhelming majority of programs did comply, even
without funding to make up the differentials. 66 Unlike New York State, the
ACGME was able to make the potential costs of non-compliance significantly
greater than the benefits: The ACGME stated that failure to comply with the
ACGME work hour regulations could result in the ACGME withdrawing or
temporarily suspending a residency program's accreditation.
167
The loss of ACGME accreditation has far greater consequences than a $2000
fine. If a residency program loses ACGME accreditation, its graduates are not
eligible to take the examinations required to become certified in their specialty.
68
In addition, many federal government subsidies of residency programs are
directly tied to ACGME accreditation. For example, programs that do not have
ACGME accreditation are not eligible for Medicare funds that are earmarked for
support of graduate medical education.169 Such subsidies are substantial: In 1998,
Medicare contributed almost $6.7 billion to teaching hospitals to help with the
growing costs of training physicians. 70 Thus, while hospitals might find it
burdensome to spend up to $5 million a year to comply with the ACGME's work
hour restrictions, the costs of compliance are significantly lower than the costs of
non-compliance, which gives hospitals a very strong incentive to comply.171
Furthermore, the ACGME made it clear very early in the process that the
loss of accreditation was not an idle threat. The ACGME, after receiving a report
in 2002 that Yale-New Haven Hospital's general surgery residency program was
165. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 129 (stating that the ACGME regulations are "inadequate"
and do not force public disclosure for violations).
166. Tracking Residency Work-Hour Violations, Am. Med. News, Dec. 5, 2005, available at
www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2005/l 2/05/prca 1205.htm [hereinafter Violations].
167. Accreditation Council for Graduate Med. Educ., ACGME Duty Hours Standards Fact




170. PRIMER, supra note 35, at 14-15.
171. Dr. David Leach, Executive Director of the ACGME, has stated that "[diuty hours are
being met" because "[tihe financial incentives are too heavy to risk having your accreditation
withdrawn." Myrle Croasdale, Resident Work-Hour Limits Still a Struggle One Year into
Restrictions, AM. MED. NEWS, July 19, 2004, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/
2004/07/19/prl 10719.htm.
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requiring its residents to work more than 100 hours per week, immediately stated
that it would withdraw the program's accreditation if it did not comply with new
ACGME requirements by July 2003.12 One week after the work hour
requirements went into effect, the ACGME stated that it intended to withdraw
accreditation of Johns Hopkins Hospital's internal medicine program, effective
July 2004, due to violations.
7 3
The ACGME, unlike New York, has also shown no signs of reducing
enforcement. During the 2004-05 academic year, the ACGME reviewed 2002 of
the 8037 ACGME-accredited residency programs for violations., 74 Of these
programs, it cited only 147 for duty-hour violations. In other words, 92.7%
surveyed programs were in compliance with the ACGME regulations .
75
2. Problems with Private Centralized Regulation
At first glance, one may think that ACGME regulation has been highly
successful. After all, in just two years the ACGME has managed to get more than
ninety-two percent of residency programs to comply with its work hour
regulations, without the need for legislation or substantial government aid.1
76
However, a closer examination of ACGME regulation shows several
disadvantages to entrusting the ACGME with this responsibility.
Perhaps the most serious problem with the ACGME as a regulator is that it
has imposed a one-size-fits-all set of regulations on all residency programs
without determining whether its regulations can further the underlying goal of
improving patient safety. The ACGME, by forcing residency programs
nationwide to implement the ACGME regulations, has made individual residency
programs unable to experiment with alternate methods of improving patient
safety. Of course, the inability of residency programs to experiment with
alternate methods would not be considered a major loss if there were a universal
consensus that the ACGME's regulations were the best solution to the sleepy
resident problem. However, such a consensus does not exist; in fact, a substantial
portion of the medical community believes that the ACGME regulations may
actually work against the goal of improving patient safety.
Some hospitals have responded to the ACGME work hour limits by creating
172. Adam Mehes, Med School Program Reaccredited, YALE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 30, 2002,
available at http://www.yaledailynews.com/article.asp?AID=20458.
173. Patrick Gilbert & Mary Ellen Miller, Out of Time, HOPKINS MED., Winter 2004, available
at http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/hmn/W04/top.cfm.
174. Violations, supra note 166.
175. Id.
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two shifts - a day shift and a night shift - and hiring additional physicians to
make up the difference. Brigham and Women's Hospital in Boston, for instance,
responded to the change by hiring an additional thirty doctors to cover the night
shift. 77 Many doctors, however, argue that having different doctors cover
different shifts will endanger patient safety by impairing continuity of care. The
chief surgeon of Massachusetts General Hospital stated that having different
teams is a bad idea because night shift doctors would not be as familiar with
patients admitted in the day shift, and vice versa. 78 Such lack of familiarity may
lead to doctors making poor decisions; the chair of Boston Medical Center's
orthopedic surgery department also observed several "poor patient care decisions
and outcomes resulting from the on-call doctor not giving a good handoff, which
is a symptom of the 80-hour rule." 179 Another doctor found significant continuity
of care problems at her hospital. In fact, she and other attending physicians have
had to devote a substantial amount of additional time reviewing x-ray findings,
intake and output records, and other patient information because residents are
rarely able to complete these important tasks when forced to sign out.' 80 Despite
attempts to mitigate the problem, this doctor has still observed a significant
decline in patient safety at her hospital. After all, "[h]ow can a housestaff team be
expected to determine whether cellulitis is improving or worsening if the same
individual does not examine the patient on consecutive days?"'
' 8 1
Such concerns from physicians are not uncommon. In fact, a national survey
of neurosurgery programs conducted by the Mayo Clinic found that ninety-three
percent of residency program directors and residents themselves felt that the
ACGME's work hour limits hurt continuity of patient care.' 82 A survey of ob-gyn
residents conducted after the regulations went into effect found similar results.
Most ob-gyn residents viewed the hour limits as problematic due to loss of
continuity, and some were concerned that they would miss the deliveries of
patients they were following due to the eighty-hour limit. 1
83
177. Anne Barnard & Liz Kowalczyk, Medical Resident Workload Curbed Big Impact Seen on
Hub Hospitals, BOSTON GLOBE, June 13, 2002, at Al.
178. Id.
179. Croasdale, supra note 57.
180. Amy L. Friedman, Letter to the Editor: Resident Work Hour Limits Are Compromising
Patient Safety, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 4, 2003, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/
2003/12t03.htm (follow "Resident Work Hour Limits Are Compromising Patient Safety" hyperlink)
(password protected).
181. Id.
182. Myrle Croasdale, The 80-Hour Experience: What Happens When Residents Have To
Leave, AM. MED. NEWS, July 25, 2005, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/
2005/07/25/prsaO725.htm.
183. Myrle Croasdale, Medical Residents Give Thumbs-Up to 80-Hour Limit, AM. MED. NEWS,
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Poor care decisions due to lack of continuity, however, are not the only
patient safety concern associated with the ACGME regulations. While the
ACGME limits have reduced the number of hours worked by medical residents,
these limits have caused attending physicians to work longer hours to make up
part of the difference. As one doctor put it, "[t]he work has to be done, and it's
falling on the older physicians."'' 84 This same doctor observes that it is now not
uncommon for her to be on call for up to forty hours at a time. 8 5 In addition to
spending more hours on call, attending physicians have to spend more time in
educational conferences with residents, but as a result of the ACGME limits, it is
not uncommon for some residents not to attend conferences about particular
patients, since attending the conference would violate the ACGME regulations.1
8 6
Furthermore, in order to minimize the risks to patient safety due to lack of
continuity of care, some attending physicians must spend hours collecting, rather
than just reviewing, patient records, since residents rarely perform these
functions before turning over patients to another shift. 187 In fact, the work hour
limits have caused the morning rounds of some attending physicians to last thirty
to fifty percent longer than in the past, forcing these physicians either to work
significantly longer hours or to see fewer patients. 188 If fatigue and sleep loss
increase the chance of medical errors, reducing resident fatigue while increasing
attending physician fatigue may not improve patient safety.
However, there remains considerable doubt within the medical community
as to whether limits on resident work hours actually reduce resident fatigue. The
belief that work hour limits will translate into better rested residents relies on the
assumption that residents, when given additional free time, will use that free time
to sleep. 89 Although the ACGME has taken this assumption for granted, studies
have shown that this assumption is not as safe as one might think. One study, for
example, found that decreasing work hours for one group of residents did not
cause that group to sleep longer hours than another group of residents who
continued to work the same schedule.' 90 An additional study found that surgical
Sept. 12, 2005, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2005/09/12/prsbO9l2.htm.
184. Myrle Croasdale, Resident Hour Limits May Hit Attendings, AM. MED. NEWS, July 7, 2003,




187. Friedman, supra note 180.
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., Am. Med. Student Ass'n, Principles Regarding Resident and Student Work
Hours, http://www.amsa.org/about/ppp/rwh.cfm (last visited Oct. 17, 2006) (making a connection
between fewer working hours and reduced fatigue and sleepiness).
190. Richardson, supra note 147.
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residents averaged the same amount of sleep per week regardless of whether they
were on an every-other-night, every-third-night, or every-fourth-night on call
schedule.' 9' In fact, no study has found that work reductions cause sleep
increases in residents.192
Other studies examining the indirect relationship between hours worked and
patient care have not found a positive relationship between the two. For example,
a 1991 study found that while work hour restrictions improved resident
perceptions of their quality of life, there was no improvement in perceived
patient care or resident examination scores. 193 In fact, two studies - one
conducted in 1998194 and the other in 2002'9' - found that work hour reductions
resulted in a perceived decrease in the quality of patient care, even though
resident quality of life increased. Another study, which examined objective
changes in patient care quality rather than perceived changes, found that work
hour restrictions resulted in a greater number of complications and delayed test
orderings by residents.1
96
Some may wonder why the ACGME implemented work hour regulations
despite the lack of a consensus that work hour limits actually improve the quality
of patient care. As discussed earlier, the threat of federal legislation played a
major role in the ACGME's decision to tie work hour limits to program
accreditation; rather than cede regulatory power to the federal government, the
ACGME instituted its own regulations in order to lessen the need for
governmental intervention and preserve its power.' 97 Given these circumstances,
it is not surprising that, despite some differences, the ACGME regulations largely
paralleled the proposed federal legislation. 198
What is cause for concern, however, is the ACGME's inflexibility toward its
regulations even after it became fairly certain that the government would not pass
federal resident work hour legislation. The ACGME has not publicly announced
that it will reexamine the efficacy of its regulations. In an article discussing the
191. R.G. Sawyer et al., Intern Call Schedules and Their Relationship to Sleep, Operating Room
Participation, Stress, and Satisfaction, 126 SURGERY 337 (1999).
192. Sigrid Veasey et al., Sleep Loss and Fatigue in Residency Training, 288 JAMA 1116, 1122
(2002).
193. Kelly, supra note 24.
194. Conigliaro, supra note 23.
195. C.B. Barden et al., Effects of Limited Work Hours on Surgical Training, 195 J. AM. C.
SURGEONS 531 (2002).
196. Laine Christine et al., The Impact of a Regulation Restricting Medical House Staff Working
Hours on the Quality of Patient Care, 269 JAMA 374 (1993).
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state of graduate medical education, Kenneth Ludmerer and Michael Johns
expressed their displeasure with the ACGME's handling of its work hour
regulations: "[W]e find it disturbing that, without good evidence or outcome
data, major regulations have been implemented that are contrary to the best
judgment of many educators."' 99
Several program directors feel that such inflexibility and overall lack of
concern for educator input signifies an inherent problem with the ACGME. One
such director believes that "[t]he ACGME has no idea what life as a patient or
resident is like today, and I am frightened by what we are now turning out.',
200
While the ACGME has spent years evaluating the quality of residency programs,
some feel that the ACGME has done a poor job evaluating its own performance,
with the rapid implementation of its work hour limits and its unwillingness to
consider other possibilities the result of a larger problem of poor internal self
evaluation and little accountability to other organizations. 20 Though some have
recommended that the ACGME conduct a thorough internal review and submit to
a peer review by an external commission, the ACGME has not taken such
steps.2°2 Since the ACGME possesses a monopoly over graduate medical
education accreditation, it has little or no incentive to improve itself, and
individual residency programs have no choice but to submit to whatever policies
the ACGME wishes to impose on them.
D. Public Centralized Regulation
Because the U.S. government has never instituted public centralized
regulation of resident working conditions, it is not possible to point to examples
of real world successes or failures.20 3 However, one can engage in informed
speculation about the results of public centralized regulation by examining the
pros and cons of public control as well as centralized control, drawing from
experiences with both state regulation and ACGME regulation.
As with centralized ACGME regulation, federal legislation would impose a
single standard on all residency programs, and thus prevent any
experimentation. 20 4 However, like public entities such as state governments, the
federal government consists of politicians who must make tradeoffs among




203. Although several European countries have passed national legislation limiting resident
work hours, the inherent differences between graduate medical education in Europe and in the
United States makes comparisons between the two difficult.
204. See supra Section III.B (discussing the benefits of experimentation).
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differing political priorities, as well as administrative and regulatory agencies
that have multiple mandates and limited budgets.2 °5 It is likely, then, that federal
intervention would involve the government creating mandatory work hour limits
over the objections of educators, but then not properly enforcing those limits due
to a lack of political will or financial resources, as in New York; however, the
legislation's national reach would have a chilling effect and prevent
experimentation with other regulatory systems. Furthermore, the nature of the
national political process would make amending poorly conceived regulations a
longer and more difficult process. Therefore, it seems likely that public
centralized regulation would bring about a "worst of both worlds" scenario.
While society would suffer all the disadvantages of ACGME regulation and state
government regulation, it would reap the benefits of neither.
This does not mean that the federal government has no role to play in
graduate medical education. The federal government has greatly improved the
quality of graduate medical education by providing billions of dollars in
subsidies to teaching hospitals.0 6 Furthermore, the federal government may still
pass legislation that enhances the strength of regulations implemented by other
regulating bodies. For instance, many have believed that both the New York
State regulations and the ACGME regulations lack adequate whistleblower
protections for those who report violations.20 7 If such protections are non-existent
or inadequate, the federal government would likely not cause substantial harm by
extending federal whistleblower protection legislation to medical residents.
Similarly, the federal government may require accreditors to publicly disclose the
208names of hospitals that have violated the accreditor's work hour regulations.
205. See supra Section II.B (discussing the disadvantages of entrusting governments and
government agencies with regulatory responsibilities).
206. PRIMER, supra note 35, at 14-16.
207. The American Medical Student Association believes that the lack of whistleblower
protection for residents who report suspected violations of the ACGME regulations may prevent
many residents from coming forward, out of a fear that their superiors would retaliate against them
by singling them out and providing poor letters of recommendation. Press Release, Am. Med.
Student Ass'n, Medical Students Mark Historic Work Hours Reform with Call for Whistleblower
Protection, Public Accountability (June 30, 2003), available at http://www.amsa.org/news/
release2.cfm?id=146.
208. Currently the ACGME is not required to publicly disclose the identities of hospitals that
have violated its resident work hour guidelines. The American Medical Student Association
believes that federal legislation is necessary to force the ACGME to make these disclosures. Am.
Med. Student Ass'n, Frequently Asked Questions About Resident Work Hour Reform,
http://www.amsa.org/rwh/faq.cfm (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
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IV. THE CASE FOR PRIVATE DECENTRALIZED REGULATION
Neither the free market approach nor any of the three regulatory schemes
most frequently discussed by researchers seem ideal; while most possess at least
one benefit over the others, all have at least one prominent cost that the others do
not share. The free market, while allowing for experimentation, fails to
internalize the externality of patient safety. While private centralized regulation
internalizes this, it fails to allow for experimentation. State government
regulation, while also allowing for experimentation, results in significant
resource and enforcement problems that have little impact on patient safety.
Lastly, federal government regulation would both prohibit experimentation and
have no positive impact on patient safety, thus resulting in a significant cost
without a corresponding benefit.
Given that a regulatory method should be adopted even if it is not ideal,
most academics and practitioners who have taken a position on this issue have
advocated for a particular regulatory method not because it will solve the
underlying problems, but because other regulatory methods are comparatively
weaker.20 9 This least-of-three-evils approach is appropriate if one considers only
three choices that are known to be imperfect. However, there is no reason to limit
this debate to only three regulatory choices. This Section argues that a fourth
regulatory scheme exists that possesses the major benefits of the other schemes
without suffering from their disadvantages: private decentralized regulation.
A. What is Private Decentralized Regulation?
Private decentralized regulation combines the private sector oversight found
in private centralized (ACGME) regulation with the diversity of regulating
bodies found in public decentralized (state government) regulation. Rather than
permitting the ACGME monopoly over graduate medical education accreditation
to continue, the U.S. government would disperse accreditation responsibilities to
five or six separate private organizations operated by medical professionals. Each
accreditor would maintain a monopoly over accrediting residency programs in a
particular geographic region; in other words, residency programs would not have
the option of "accreditor shopping."
209. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 46; Whetsell, supra note 47.
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B. Evaluating Private Decentralized Regulation
1. The Benefits of Private Decentralized Regulation
Private decentralized regulation would ideally combine the benefits of public
decentralized regulation with the benefits of private centralized regulation
without incurring the costs of either system. Each new accreditor, like the
ACGME, would remain a private entity whose primary purpose would involve
evaluating the educational quality of residency programs. These accreditors
would enforce their resident regulations just as the ACGME has been able to
successfully enforce its regulations without much difficulty.2 10 Since site visits
are already a part of an accreditor's responsibilities, these new accreditors would
regularly visit hospitals and investigate violations just as the ACGME has been
able to for the past two years. Because these accreditors serve narrow purposes
and are privately funded, there is no danger that these organizations would cease
enforcement because of budget cuts or a change in the political climate.
However, because accreditors would possess regional monopolies, rather
than national monopolies, innovation and experimentation would take place. As
discussed earlier, the medical profession has not yet reached a consensus on the
resident work hour issue, with as many as ninety-three percent of neurosurgery
residency program directors and residents believing that the current ACGME
guidelines hurt continuity of care.2 1 Furthermore, those who find fault with the
ACGME guidelines are unsatisfied with the regulations for different reasons, and
they disagree as to the optimal solution to the sleepy resident problem.2t 2 Given
the extent of diversity of opinion on the issue, it is likely that medical
professionals serving on the boards of five or six different graduate medical
education accreditors would devise five or six different regulatory schemes. For
example, one accreditor may institute a blanket eighty-hour work limit, a la the
ACGME; another accreditor might not institute hour limits at all, but mandate
that residents obtain a certain amount of rest before performing certain tasks, or
require residents to sleep a certain number of total hours per week; still another
accreditor may use a combination of work limits and mandated sleep, while yet
another might acknowledge differences between specialties and have separate
requirements based on specialty.
Through such experimentation, at least one regulatory system should present
itself as clearly superior to the others. Once empirical evidence reveals a superior
system, other accreditors will alter their regulations in order to adopt it. Doctors
210. Violations, supra note 166.
211. Croasdale, supra note 182.
212. See supra Section lII.C (discussing the faults with private centralized regulation).
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and hospital administrators value empirical evidence.213 Although culture
accounts for part of the opposition to work hour limits, 214 most residency
program directors have opposed the ACGME work hour limits due to the lack of
evidence demonstrating a causal connection between lower work hours and
higher patient safety.215 If empirical evidence were to show a strong relationship
between fewer medical errors and a certain method of regulating resident work
conditions - whether it be limiting hours, or mandating certain rest periods, or
some other practice - program directors would likely support the change.216
However, attitudes will not change without evidence, 217 and evidence will not
manifest itself without experimentation. As long as the ACGME subjects
residency programs nationwide to the same regulations, such experimentation
will not take place, and neither the ACGME, program directors, nor society will
know whether the current regulatory system is truly the best way to further the
goal of patient safety.
2. The Costs of Private Decentralized Regulation
Some might argue that private decentralized regulation may raise concerns
about equity. By subjecting residents in different geographic regions to different
working conditions, with the knowledge that some working conditions are likely
more conducive to patient safety than others, patients in some geographic areas
may face a greater risk of being harmed by a resident's medical error than
patients in other regions. This is certainly a possibility; however, one must
remember that such tradeoffs always exist when making policy changes.
Currently, very little evidence exists that there is a relationship between hours
worked and patient safety. Not only has no study shown that residents will use
their additional free time to sleep, but multiple studies have also demonstrated
that work hour limits actually put patients in more danger due to impaired
continuity of care and other factors.218
While some may find it psychologically pleasing to know that there are
uniform national standards in place, the existence of such standards does not
mean that the standards are ideal, nor does it mean that abandoning the standards
would cause more harm either in the short term or the long term. If further
experimentation through private decentralized regulation were to show that
213. Trowbridge & Wachter, supra note 101.
214. See Groopman, supra note 55; Pelton, supra note 52.
215. Ludmerer & Johns, supra note 49, at 1086.
216. Id.
217. Trowbridge & Wachter, supra note 101.
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limiting residents to eighty hours of work per week is the ideal regulatory system,
then yes, the shift to private decentralized regulation would have caused a net
harm, for some people in the country would have experienced increased harm
while others would have retained their current safety levels. However, if
experimentation proved that an eighty-hour work limit not only is not the best
solution, but also that it is actually harmful to patient care, then the switch to
private decentralized regulation would have made many people better off while
making no one worse off than they were under the ACGME regulations;
furthermore, by discovering that the eighty-hour limit is not the best way to
further the goal of patient safety, all future patients would become better off as
the accreditors who had retained the eighty-hour limit regulations in their regions
would change their systems. Without actually knowing the most effective way to
enhance patient safety, it is not possible to measure whether switching to private
decentralized regulation would incur a net cost or net benefit to society.
However, given the lack of evidence showing a connection between fewer work
hours and improved patient safety, it seems more likely than not that a switch to
private decentralized regulation would result in a net benefit rather than a net
loss.
3. Criticisms and Potential Barriers to Implementation
For a variety of reasons, some may feel that private decentralized regulation
is either harmful or impractical. This Sub-section will respond to these potential
criticisms.
a. Reversion to the Laissez-Faire System
One might argue that residency programs have already had decades to
experiment with different systems, but chose not to, suggesting that residency
program directors may not truly desire innovation. Some might believe that these
directors would try to persuade the new accreditors not to enact regulations at all,
and they might demand a return to the laissez-faire system, just as medical
organizations have lobbied against state and federal work hour legislation.2 19
Such beliefs are misguided.
While it is true that individual residency programs did not experiment with
limiting resident work hours or other potential solutions to the sleepy resident
problem during the laissez-faire period, one must acknowledge a fundamental
difference between the role of a residency program director or hospital
administrator determining policies for his or her own program or hospital and the
219. See supra Section III.B (explaining how medical lobbying organizations prevented
California from enacting state regulations governing medical resident work hours).
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same individual serving as a member of an accrediting board. Hospitals exist in a
competitive environment: A single hospital or residency program has very little
incentive to unilaterally deviate from the status quo when doing so would incur
considerable expense and little, if any, benefit. For example, if it would cost a
hospital $2 million a year to reduce the resident work week from 130 hours to 80
hours, a rational hospital administrator would not incur the expense unless
enacting this change would cause the hospital to gain at least $2 million a year in
other benefits, such as having to settle fewer malpractice claims due to fewer
patient errors. Even if a third party, such as society as a whole, would gain
benefits exceeding $2 million a year from the policy change, the hospital itself
has no incentive to put itself in a worse position in order to benefit society. By
implementing a policy change where the costs are greater than the benefits, the
hospital would put itself in a worse position relative to its peer hospitals, who, as
rational actors, would not have adopted such policies.
The same individual, however, in his or her capacity as a member of a
regulatory board, would likely act differently. While an individual hospital has
little or no incentive to unilaterally put itself in a worse position to benefit
society, all hospitals in a given region have a greater incentive to engage in such
action. If an individual hospital acts unilaterally, it loses its competitive position
relative to other hospitals by incurring an expense that the others do not also
bear; however, this concern disappears if all hospitals in a given region make the
same change and incur similar expenses.
Although medical professional organizations have lobbied against state and
federal regulations, one must remember that medical professional opposition was
rooted in resistance to government regulation and not a sentiment against
regulation in general.22° Physicians, as discussed earlier, are deeply suspicious of
government intervention, particularly when there is a lack of evidence that such
intervention is even necessary, and they prefer that health care professionals
create regulations. 221 Although physicians also generally oppose the ACGME
regulations, this opposition is due to the ACGME's decision to implement major
regulations nationwide, without evidence that the regulations have any efficacy
and against the advice of educators and informed medical professionals, which is
a reflection of the ACGME's growing detachment from practitioners. 222 If the
new regional accreditors pledged to obtain a significant amount of input from
residency program directors and other medical educators before deciding on a set
of regulations, it is doubtful that the medical community would lobby against
220. See supra Sub-sections III.B-C.1 (discussing why doctors opposed attempts at state and
federal regulation of resident work hours).
221. Id.
222. Ludmerer & Johns, supra note 49, at 1086.
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private decentralized regulation.
Furthermore, one must consider the political environment that gave rise to
the ACGME regulations. As discussed earlier, the ACGME did not truly desire to
regulate medical resident working hours; rather, the emerging threats of resident
unionization and federal government regulation forced the ACGME to institute
regulations in order to allow the health care profession to retain some semblance
of control over resident working conditions. z23 This threat of external control
would remain if a shift to private decentralized regulation occurred. The medical
professionals serving on accrediting boards, even if they personally would rather
see a return to the laissez-faire system, would understand that such a decision
might motivate the federal government to pass federal work-hour legislation over
the objections of those in the medical profession. Since the medical profession
has demonstrated that it wishes to retain at least some control over resident work
hours,224 it is unlikely that any accreditor would refuse to regulate resident
working conditions, for such a move would likely cause the federal government
to take the choice out of their hands permanently.
b. Impact of Resident Preferences
Although residency programs would not be able to pick their accreditor
under a private decentralized regulation system, residency program applicants
would have the ability to select their residency programs on the basis of work
hour regulations imposed by their accreditors 5 Resident program applicants
might rank certain programs higher than others during the "Match" process based
on how they perceive certain regulatory schemes; if the most talented residents
disproportionately prefer one regulatory system while "sleepy" residents
gravitate toward a different system, it might become more difficult to identify the
223. See supra Section II.C (discussing the ACGME's motivation to regulate resident working
conditions).
224. Id.
225. Most prospective medical residents apply to residency programs through the National
Residency Matching Program (NRMP), commonly known as "The Match." Each year,
approximately 16,000 U.S. medical school students and 18,000 other applicants participate in the
NRMP. See Nat'l Residency Matching Program, About the NRMP, http://www.nrmp.org/about-
nrmp/index.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2006) (discussing the NRMP's history and the size of its user
base). Prospective residents use the NRMP by ranking residency programs based on their
preferences; similarly, residency programs rank applicants based on their own preferences. The
NRMP then uses a computerized algorithm to compare these lists and "match" applicants to
programs. See Nat'l Residency Matching Program, How the NRMP Process Works,
http://www.nrmp.org/about-nrmp/how.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2006) (explaining how the NRMP
matches applicants with programs).
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ideal regulatory system.
However, it is not likely that resident self selection would pose a problem.
226Applicants consider a wide range of factors during the matching process. A
program's geographic location arguably has the greatest impact; although some
applicants are willing to consider residency programs in multiple geographic
areas,227 they often begin the process with at least some geographic constraints.228
Some applicants believe that doing one's residency in the state or region one
wishes to eventually practice will enhance post-residency employment
prospects, 229 while other applicants, particularly women, may strongly prefer
certain geographic regions for family or other reasons. 230 Applicants also place a
very high value on a program's academic reputation; in fact, one recent study
found that location and academic reputation were two of the five most important
factors that influenced internal medicine residents to select their particular
program.2 3' There is no reason to believe that a critical mass of applicants would
place a greater value on regulatory system than program reputation or their
geographical preferences.
2 32
Furthermore, accreditors could still gather enough data to identify the ideal
regulatory system even if applicant self selection took place. The typical
residency program lasts between three and seven years; 233 while regulatory
systems may impact applicant preferences, they would not have an impact on
residents who chose their residency programs before those regulatory systems
were adopted. Thus, accreditors could obtain the empirical evidence they need by
observing those currently enrolled in residency programs.
226. See generally KENNETH V. ISERSON, ISERSON'S GETTING INTO A RESIDENCY: A GUIDE FOR
MEDICAL STUDENTS (6th ed. 2003) (discussing the residency application process, including criteria
applicants should consider when evaluating programs).
227. Id. at 244-47.
228. See, e.g., Posting of Global Disrobal to http://forums.studentdoctor.net/archive/index.php/t-
98718.html (Jan. 12, 2004, 16:01 EST) (stating that picking geographical locations is the first step
in considering different residency programs).
229. See, e.g., Posting of GreatPumpkin to http://forums.studentdoctor.net/archive/index.php/t-
30879.html (June 26, 2002, 15:49 EST) (suggesting the value of doing one's residency in the
region one wishes to practice).
230. See, e.g., Eva M. Aagaard et al., Factors Affecting Medical Students' Selection of an
Internal Medicine Residency Program, 97. J. NAT'L MED. Ass'N 1264, 1264 (2005) (indicating that
geographic location is ranked third of the five biggest factors all applicants consider when selecting
an internal medicine residency program, and that women rank location more highly than do men).
231. Id. at 1266.
232. For instance, there is apparently no evidence that the New York state regulations had a
meaningful impact on applications to New York residency programs.
233. Reuter, supra note 40, at 486.
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c. Creation Not Practical
Others might argue that the creation of multiple private accreditors is not
practical. Since the ACGME and its previous incarnation has been the sole
graduate medical education accreditor for almost three decades, multiple private
accreditors may not manifest themselves if the ACGME's monopoly is broken.
Such a fear is unfounded. New accreditors would not likely find it difficult to
finance their creation and continued existence. Most accreditors, including the
ACGME, receive much of their funding from the accreditation fees they charge
the programs they accredit. Since each accreditor would have a monopoly over
graduate medical education accreditation in its region and would not have to
worry about losing programs to competing accreditors, these accreditors would
receive a substantial amount of guaranteed funding each year that would cover
their operating costs.234
Perhaps the most serious barrier to private decentralized regulation would be
opposition from the ACGME, which would lobby to retain its power. It is
difficult to speculate as to how one could overcome this political barrier; one
possibility might involve allowing the ACGME to retain a role as an umbrella
organization of graduate medical education accreditors, much as the Council for
Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) serves as an umbrella organization for
college and university accreditors.235
d. Alternate Solutions
Some may believe that solutions other than private decentralized regulation
could improve the medical resident regulatory situation. For instance, one might
propose that the federal government create several government-controlled and
funded boards that would determine resident regulation policies within a given
region. This system would not only preserve regional experimentation, but also
minimize the role of state politics in the regulation process. In other words,
public opinion, state medical organization lobbying, and the political
considerations of state elected officials would not prevent regulations from being
implemented, as they have in the past.23 6 However, such a system would not
234. If funding does not exist to cover an accreditor's initial start-up costs, the federal
government may provide a short term loan to cover such early expenses.
235. For more information about CHEA, see Council for Higher Educ. Accreditation, CHEA
Home Page, http://www.chea.org (last visited Oct. 17, 2006) (providing a general overview of
CHEA and its functions).
236. As discussed earlier, several states have failed to pass legislation limiting resident work
hours due to such factors. See Boodman, supra note 53; Japenga, supra note 81 (discussing state
regulatory attempts in New York and elsewhere).
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possess any practical benefits over private decentralized regulation, while still
retaining some of the disadvantages inherent to public entities. These boards, as
an extension of the federal government, would still face the possibility of having
their effectiveness limited due to the political process; for example, the boards
would remain susceptible to budget cuts. Furthermore, unless these boards would
also assume the ACGME's accreditation function, such a split would become
economically inefficient, since both the ACGME and these boards would spend a
substantial amount of time and money conducting separate site visits of residency
programs. After all, the fact that the ACGME already conducts many site visits
as part of its normal duties is one of the primary reasons it has been able to
enforce its regulations so well relative to the state of New York.
Of course, this raises another alternate solution: Why not simply reform the
ACGME from within? For instance, if the problem with the ACGME regulations
is that they do not allow for experimentation, why not lobby the ACGME to
create multiple alternative sets of regulations that hospitals can choose to
implement at their own discretion? Unfortunately, this solution is easier said than
done; medical professionals have lobbied the ACGME to change its
regulations. 237 The ACGME, however, has been non-responsive to these
overtures,238 and has consistently rejected requests from residency program
directors and other professionals that it revise its resident work hour
regulations.
239
Furthermore, allowing hospitals to choose between alternate regulations
would not necessarily result in natural experimentation. As the past has
demonstrated, hospitals, when given the choice, will implement the regulation
method that will cost the hospital the least amount of money.240 For example, if
hospitals are given the choice between limiting resident work hours to eighty
hours a week or requiring residents to average at least six hours of sleep per
night, most hospitals would likely choose the latter regulation since the costs of
complying with that regulation would be significantly lower than complying with
the other regulation. 241 Thus, true experimentation would not take place, and the
ACGME would not have the necessary data to determine the ideal regulatory
method. For natural experimentation to occur, a regulator must require all
hospitals within a given region to follow one set of regulations while hospitals in




240. See supra Section II.B (explaining that monetary incentives and disincentives were why
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another region must follow a different set of regulations.
C. Distance Learning: A Case Study in Private Decentralized Regulation
Since private decentralized regulation of graduate medical education does
not currently exist, one cannot point to real-world evidence of success or failure.
However, private decentralized regulation is common in other areas of education.
Most notably, colleges and universities as a whole are subject to private
decentralized regulation.242
Just as graduate medical education has faced significant turmoil due to the
resident work hour debate, colleges and universities have had to struggle with
their own major controversy. For the past two decades, accreditors of colleges
and universities have debated whether distance learning programs, particularly
entirely online universities, should be accredited, as well as how accreditors
should evaluate these programs if they can be accredited. This Section contrasts
how private decentralized regulators (the regional accrediting agencies that
accredit colleges and universities) and a private centralized regulator (the
American Bar Association, which accredits law school J.D. programs) resolved
the distance learning controversy, and it applies lessons from the distance
learning case study to the resident work hour controversy.
1. College Accreditation: A Brief Overview
Private, nongovernmental organizations accredit colleges and universities in
the United States.243 Educational institution accreditation serves four primary
purposes: 244 assuring quality,245 facilitating access to federal funds, 246 easing
transfer of credits,247 and engendering private sector confidence.248 Accreditors
242. While colleges and universities as institutions are subject to private decentralized
regulation, individual programs within those institutions, such as J.D. and M.D. programs, are also
subject to other types of regulation, most commonly private centralized regulation. See infra Sub-
section V.C. 1 (providing a brief overview of the college accreditation system).
243. Council for Higher Educ. Accreditation, Accrediting Organizations in the U.S.: How Do
They Operate To Assure Quality? 1 (2006), http://www.chea.org/pdf/fact-sheet-5_operation.pdf
[hereinafter CHEA, Quality].
244. Council for Higher Educ. Accreditation, Profile of Accreditation 2 (2006),
http://www.chea.org/pdf/fact-sheet-l-profile.pdf [hereinafter CHEA, Profile].
245. See id. ("Accreditation is the primary means by which colleges, universities and programs
assure academic quality to students and the public.").
246. See id. ("Accreditation of institutions and programs is required in order for students to gain
access to federal funds such as student grants and loans and other federal support.").
247. See id. ("Accreditation of institutions and programs is important to students for smooth
transfer of courses and programs among colleges and universities.").
43
Ciolli: The Medical Resident Working Hours Debate
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2007
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
are certified by the U.S. Department of Education (USDE) 249 the USDE
recognized fifty-six accreditors as of December 2002.25 o
One can divide accrediting agencies into two broad groups: institutional
accreditors and specialty accreditors. Institutional accreditors, as the name
implies, accredit entire educational institutions. 25 1 One can further subdivide
institutional accreditors into two subgroups: regional accreditors and national
accreditors.252 Regional accreditors evaluate institutions in six specific clusters of
states, or regions, with each regional accreditor having a monopoly over regional
institutional accreditation within its own region; national accreditors evaluate
institutions nationwide regardless of the institution's geographic region.
253
Though the USDE makes no official distinction between regional and
national institutional accreditors when it comes to eligibility for federal funds,
educational institutions and employers overwhelmingly consider the regional
accreditors far more prestigious and view regional accreditation as the gold
standard of institutional quality.254 These perceptions are reflected in the
characteristics of institutions that seek regional and national accreditation.
Virtually all institutions that have received regional accreditation - over ninety-
seven percent - are both degree-granting and non-profit.255 In contrast, sixty-four
percent of nationally accredited institutions do not grant degrees, and seventy-
nine percent are for-profit.256 Furthermore, many nationally accredited
institutions are single-purpose schools, e.g. bible colleges and occupational
training schools. 2 5 7 Because few degree-granting colleges and universities pursue
national accreditation, and since many colleges that are nationally accredited
chose national accreditation because they could not become regionally
accredited,258 future mentions of institutional accreditors in this Note refers to
248. See id. ("Accredited status of an institution or program is important to employers when
evaluating credentials of job applicants and providing financial support to current employees
seeking additional education.").
249. Id. at 1.
250. Id. at 2.
251. CHEA, Quality, supra note 243, at 1.
252. CHEA, Profile, supra note 244, at 1.
253. Id. at 2.
254. See Nathan Whiteside, Are Distance Learning Degrees Legitimate?, http://www.degree
info.com/articlel_2.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2006) ("The 'gold standard' would be... a US-
based school which is regionally accredited.").
255. CHEA, Profile, supra note 244, at 1.
256. Id. at 2.
257. Id.
258. The American Military University, for instance, sought accreditation from the Distance
Education Training Council (DETC), a national accreditor, after an unsuccessful attempt to achieve
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regional accreditation.
Specialty accreditors, in contrast, do not accredit entire institutions, 25 9 but
accredit specific programs within an institution. 26 Specialty accreditors exist for
dozens of specialties, ranging from law to funeral service to veterinary
medicine.2 6' Unlike regional accreditors, specialty accreditors have a national
reach in their specialty area.262 Thus, specialty accreditors are a form of private
centralized regulation, while regional accreditors are analogous to private
decentralized regulation.
2. Challenges Caused by Distance Learning
The growing popularity of distance learning programs has challenged both
institutional and specialty accreditors. Distance learning, contrary to popular
belief, is not a new phenomenon. In fact, distance learning predates the existence
of most U.S. accrediting agencies.263 However, for most of its history distance
learning never particularly posed a challenge for any accreditor. Until recently,
distance learning was primarily identified with correspondence courses, where
the student and the instructor communicate through postal mail. While a very
small minority of established American universities created correspondence
programs,264 the overwhelming majority of correspondence courses were run by
regional accreditation. Another institution, the University of South Africa, obtained DETC
accreditation because it was ineligible for regional accreditation due to its location in a foreign
country, yet still wanted recognition from a USDE-approved accreditor so that its growing number
of American students could receive financial aid from the U.S. government.
259. Some exceptions apply, such as when an institution has a singular purpose and only offers
one program that is in the domain of a specialty accreditor. For instance, Brooklyn Law School is
accredited by the American Bar Association, a specialty accreditor, but not by a regional or
national institutional accreditor. See CHEA Database, http://www.chea.org/search/search.asp (last
visited Dec. 8, 2006) (search for "Brooklyn Law School").
260. CHEA, Profile, supra note 244.
261. For a complete list of specialty accreditors, see Council for Higher Educ. Accreditation,
Recognized Accrediting Organizations (2006), http://www.chea.org/pdf/CHEAUSDE_AllAccred.
pdf [hereinafter CHEA, List] (providing a list of all accreditors recognized by the USDE or
CHEA).
262. CHEA, Profile, supra note 244, at 2.
263. For example, the University of London began to offer degrees through its distance learning
program in 1858. See Univ. of London, A Brief History, http://www.london.ac.uk/history.html (last
visited Oct. 17, 2006) (discussing the university's history, including the founding of its distance
learning program).
264. Penn State began offering correspondence courses in 1892, primarily in agriculture. In the
1920s the program began to offer courses over the radio, and in subsequent decades the school
made courses available through public and cable television as well as video and the internet. See
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diploma mills, which engaged in little or no real teaching and literally sold
unaccredited degrees through the mail for a hefty profit.265 Since almost no
legitimate American universities even offered correspondence courses, let alone
correspondence degrees,266  and since the overwhelming majority of
correspondence schools were blatantly fraudulent and did not even attempt to
obtain accreditation, 26' accrediting agencies did not have to concern themselves
with evaluating distance learning programs.
Technological advances in the 1980s and 90s, however, changed the face of
distance learning. The popularization of the VCR during the 1980s caused a
small spike in distance learning programs, with some schools, including
Columbia University, offering courses and even a limited number of degrees
through videotape.268 However, distance learning programs did not become
popularized until the 1990s with the dawn of the Internet. Widespread Internet
use, as well as ever growing demands for higher education services geared
toward working professionals, 269 resulted in a large increase in distance learning
programs. The 1990s saw many regionally accredited universities offer not only
online courses, but also degrees that one could complete entirely online.27° By
Penn State, Types of Courses, http://www.worldcampus.psu.edu/StudentServices-Typesof
Courses.shtml (last visited Oct. 17, 2006) (explaining distance education and providing a history of
Penn State's own distance education program). Other schools offering correspondence courses
during this period include the University of Chicago and the State University of Iowa. See Kristin
Hirst, A Distance Learning Timeline, http://www.degreeinfo.com/timeline.html (last visited Oct.
17, 2006) (providing a brief history of distance learning).
265. Diploma mills have existed in the United States since the Civil War era. See Christopher
Bahur, Diploma Mills: Fraud in Higher Education, http://www.degreeinfo.com/article24_l.html
(last visited Oct. 17, 2006) (providing a history of diploma mills).
266. Hirst, supra note 264.
267. Bahur, supra note 265.
268. Columbia University created the Columbia Video Network in 1986, offering courses and
degrees in engineering fields. Columbia Video Network, About CVN, http://www.cvn.columbia.
edu/AboutCVN/aboutcvn.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
269. In 2000, more than fifty-six percent of all college students were more than twenty-two
years old, with over twenty-six percent older than thirty. Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Total
Enrollment in All Degree-Granting Institutions by Sex, Age, and Attendance Status,
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/projections/tables/tableI L.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2006). More than
forty-one percent of college students in 2000 were enrolled as part time students. Id.
270. For more information on this phenomenon, see Risa Lieberwitz, The Corporatization of the
University: Distance Learning at the Cost of Academic Freedom?, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 73, 104-
06 (providing a list of many universities that created online distance learning programs during the
1990s, including Carnegie Mellon University, Columbia University, Cornell University, Duke
University, the London School of Economics, McGill University, New York University, Purdue
University, Stanford University, Temple University, the University of Baltimore, the University of
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2002, there were 1708 regionally accredited colleges and universities that offered
distance learning programs - more than fifty-five percent of all regionally
accredited institutions! 27 1 Perhaps even more notably, several entirely online
colleges and universities were founded during this period, such as Jones
International University27
2 and Northcentral University.
273
The creation of so many distance learning programs in such a very short
period of time caused both regional and specialty accreditors to wrestle with
many new and controversial issues. Regional accreditors had to determine
whether an institution with no physical campus should be accredited, and if so,
what standards should be applied relative to traditional "brick and mortar"
schools. 274 Furthermore, accreditors had to decide how to evaluate online
programs provided by "brick and mortar" schools that were already accredited.
For example, the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools had to
determine how it should evaluate Touro College, a school founded in 1971 with
more than 11,000 students on its home campus in New York,2 75 after Touro
launched an entirely online subsidiary school, Touro University International, in
1999, with all of its administrative offices in California and an enrollment of over
7000 students.27 6 Specialty accreditors had to make similar decisions; for
instance, the American Bar Association had to determine whether online law
schools, such as the for-profit and entirely online Concord Law School, were
eligible for ABA accreditation.27 7 However, despite facing very similar issues,
California at Los Angeles, the University of Chicago, the University of Florida, the University of
Maryland, the University of Michigan, the University of Toronto, and the University of Virginia).
271. COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUC. ACCREDITATION, ACCREDITATION AND ASSURING QUALITY IN
DISTANCE LEARNING 3 (2002) [hereinafter CHEA, DISTANCE LEARNING].
272. Jones International University was founded in 1993, and in 1999 became the first entirely
online university to receive regional accreditation. Jones International Univ., History of Jones
International University (2006), http://www.jiu.edu/about/history/timeline.php (last visited Oct. 17,
2006).
273. Northcentral University, a for-profit online institution with no physical campus, offers
degrees ranging from bachelor to doctorate level. Northcentral Univ., NCU Fact Sheet,
http://www.ncu.edu/ncu-fact-sheet.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
274. See, e.g., Kelly McCollum, Accreditation of On-Line University Draws Fire, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 2, 1999, at A33 (discussing the North Central Association of Colleges and
Schools's controversial decision to accredit Jones International University).
275. Touro College: At a Glance, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://www.usnews.com/
usnews/edu/college/directory/brief/drglance_10142_brief.php (last visited Dec. 8, 2006).
276. E-Learning: Touro University International (CA): General Information, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/eleaming/directory/elearnla_666129.htm (last
visited Dec. 8, 2006).
277. Concord Law School is a part of the Stanley Kaplan Corporation, which owns a chain of
forty-one undergraduate colleges in addition to Concord Law School. See Stephen Brier & Roy
47
Ciolli: The Medical Resident Working Hours Debate
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2007
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
regional accreditors and the ABA reached two largely different conclusions.
3. The Regional Accreditor Response to Distance Learning
As one might expect, the six regional accreditors278 developed greatly
differing evaluation standards of distance learning programs and institutions.
While some accreditors embraced distance learning and online-only institutions
and developed standards that some might consider too lenient,279 other
accreditors subjected distance learning programs and institutions to levels of
scrutiny that some may deem too harsh.280 Table One suggests some of these
disparities.
Table 1: Distance Learning Disparity Across Accreditors
Regional Accreditor Schools w/DL Programs
281
Middle States Association 59.4%
New England Association 28.6%




Rosenzweig, The Keyboard Campus; Digital Diploma Mills: The Automation of Higher Education,
THE NATION, Apr. 22, 2002, at 30 (discussing Stanley Kaplan and Concord Law School).
278. The six regional accreditors are the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, the
New England Association of Schools and Colleges, the North Central Association of Colleges and
Schools, the Northwest Commission on Colleges and Universities, the Southern Association of
Colleges and Schools, and the Western Association of Schools and Colleges. Technically there are
eight regional accreditors, since the New England Association and the Western Association have
each divided themselves into two separate commissions: one that accredits senior colleges and
universities and a second that accredits community colleges and vocational schools. CHEA, List,
supra note 261, at 1. However, since both commissions are a part of the larger association, and
since their policies do not differ drastically from each other, this Note treats them as one for
purposes of this analysis unless otherwise noted.
279. See, e.g., Posting of Rich Douglas to http://forums.degreeinfo.com/showthread.php?s
=ad9130677a09da7369f224a788e2a4ef&threadid=1854 (June 26, 2001, 19:36 GMT) (stating that
"North Central certainly has been the most open about accrediting... DL schools" and "Middle
States has been generally positive.").
280. See, e.g., id. ("WASC has always been a toughie."); Posting of John Bear to
http://forums.degreeinfo.com/showthread.php?s=ad9130677a09da7369f224a788e2a4ef&threadid =
2741 (Oct. 29, 2001, 03:47 GMT) (stating that "the Western Association is especially difficult on
nontraditional models").
281. CHEA, DISTANCE LEARNING, supra note 271, at 5.
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The most notable differences between the regional accreditors were in their
attitudes toward institutions that offered only online programs with no physical
campus. In this respect, one accreditor, the North Central Association, developed
a reputation as extremely receptive to purely online schools.28 2 The North Central
Association became the first regional accreditor to accredit an entirely online
university when it accredited Jones International University in 1999, causing a
substantial amount of controversy. 83 In contrast, two other accreditors, the
Southern Association and the Western Association, were perceived as hostile to
the idea of accrediting online schools.284 In fact, there are several documented
instances of online or mostly online schools relocating their administrative
offices after failing to receive accreditation from these associations. Walden
University, while not entirely a distance learning school, 285 moved its
administrative offices from Naples, Florida, to Minneapolis, Minnesota, so it
would fall under the jurisdiction of the North Central Association, after an
unsuccessful attempt at Southern Association accreditation.286 Touro University
International made the very unusual move of asking the Middle States
Association to include its programs under Touro College's accreditation in order
to avoid seeking Western Association accreditation.287 Most recently, the
American Military University, an entirely online institution, moved some of its
offices across the border from Virginia to West Virginia; like Walden, it failed to
achieve Southern Association accreditation and felt it would have greater success
with the North Central Association.288
282. Douglas, supra note 279.
283. McCollum, supra note 274.
284. Douglas, supra note 279.
285. For example, Walden requires its doctoral students to attend academic residencies in order
to "give doctoral students the opportunity to work face-to-face with faculty, staff, and other
doctoral students." Walden Univ., University Services: Residencies, http://www.waldenu.edu/
c/Services/UniversityServices_389.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
286. For more information about Walden University, see Walden Univ., About Walden
University, http://www.waldenu.edu/c/About/About.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
287. For more information about Touro College, see Touro Coll., About Touro College,
http://www.touro.edu/general/about.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2006). See also Posting of BillDayson
to http://forums.degreeinfo.com/showthread.php?s=5b8ef5d2f24f0ffa0f6b6166340c02d6&
threadid= 19904 (June 16, 2005, 12:44 GMT) (discussing the accreditation status of Touro College
and its various physical and online branch campuses, and observing that "Touro seems to enjoy
living on the edge").
288. The American Military University (AMU) was founded in 1993 in Virginia, and it applied
for Southern Association accreditation in 1998. In 1999, AMU was told that while it "met the
requirements of the majority of the SACS conditions," it would not receive accreditation due to
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Each regional accreditor continued to apply different standards to distance
learning programs and institutions until 2001. In that year, the regional
accreditors, realizing the need for greater uniformity in this area, convened a joint
committee to examine how accreditors should evaluate distance learning
programs. As a result of this meeting, a set of "best practices" were codified and
adopted by all of the regional accreditors. 289 These best practices "constitute a
common understanding of those elements which reflect quality distance
education programming., 290 These practices were not developed in a vacuum.
Rather, they were determined after all regional accreditors discussed their
individual experiences evaluating distance learning programs. 29 As a result of
sharing their experiences, accreditors were able to adopt the evaluation methods
proven to work best and discard those that were known to be ineffective,
resulting in all the regional accreditors adopting distance education evaluation
policies that were not only uniform,292 but better than any one accreditor had
previously enacted individually.
4. The ABA Response to Distance Learning
The ABA, as a specialty accreditor with monopoly power over J.D. program
accreditation,293 approached the distance learning controversy differently than the
regional accreditors. When faced with whether it should accredit online law
some requirements not being met. Am. Military Univ., General Information FAQs,
http://web.archive.org/web/20011218233612/http://www.amunet.edu/Generallnformation/faqs.asp
(last visited Oct. 17, 2006). In 2002, AMU created a spin-off university, the American Public
University, and created the American Public University System (APUS) to serve as an umbrella
organization for these two institutions. APUS established its corporate offices in West Virginia, and
in February 2004 APUS became a candidate for North Central Association accreditation. Am. Pub.
Univ. Sys., Accreditation and Licensure, http://www.apus.edu/APUS/Accreditation/
Accreditation-and-Licensure.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).






293. Some scholars have argued that the ABA has used its monopoly power to homogenize
legal education to the point where it is no longer a competitive market. See, e.g., Andrew P.
Morriss, The Market for Legal Education & Freedom of Association: Why the "Solomon
Amendment" Is Constitutional and Law Schools Aren't Expressive Associations, 14 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 415 (2005) ("The critical point is this: the legal education market is not a competitive
market. The lack of competition should make courts skeptical of the behavior of what gives every
appearance of being a cartel.").
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schools such as Concord Law School,2 94 the ABA's answer was very simple and
straightforward: No.295 Unlike regional accreditors, who allowed experimentation
with distance learning and discovered that schools can deliver many quality
degree programs through electronic media,296 the ABA has taken a very hard-line
approach and has retained accreditation guidelines that make it very difficult for
online law schools to become established, such as requiring physical classrooms
and libraries.297 In fact, the ABA has gone so far as to prohibit law schools from
granting credit for online or correspondence study,298 although this rule has
recently been relaxed to allow students to complete a maximum of twelve credits
online. 299 The ABA has justified such draconian measures by arguing that online
learning does not allow for proper training 300 - a conclusion obviously in conflict
with many educational administrators,
3 °1 as well as the regional accreditors.
3
02
Such a hard-line conservative reaction is not unusual for the ABA; the
organization had similar harsh restrictions against for-profit law schools, until a
U.S. Department of Justice lawsuit and subsequent settlement by the ABA forced
the accreditor to change its practices.303 The ABA's stance toward Concord and
other online law schools, then, is only "the latest example of how the ABA's
rigid and outdated standards operate to stifle innovation. 30 4 As a national
294. For more information about Concord Law School, see Concord Law Sch., Dean's
Message, http://www.concordlawschool.com/info/custom/concord/schoolinfo/message.asp (last
visited Oct. 17, 2006) (providing a brief description of the institution).
295. Geoffrey Gagnon, Join 'Em, LEGAL AFF., May-June 2004, available at http://www.legal
affairs.org/issues/May-June-2004/scene-gagnon-mayjun04.msp (last visited Dec. 8, 2006).
296. Best Practices, supra note 289.
297. Gagnon, supra note 295.
298. Id.
299. See Am. Bar Ass'n, Standard 306: Distance Education, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/
distanceeducation/Standard306.doc (last visited Oct. 17, 2006) (explaining the ABA's position on
distance education).
300. Julia Scheeres, Virtual Degrees Virtually Tough, WIRED NEws, Aug. 28, 2002,
http://www.wired.com/news/school/0,1383,54734,00.html.
301. For example, former Harvard University President Lawrence Summers "emphasized the
importance of embracing the marriage of education and technology" in his 2005 commencement
speech. See Paul D. Rosevear, The Ivy League Goes Online, AOL RES. ONLINE, Jan. 25, 2006,
http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/Departments/eleaming/?article=IvyLeagueOnline (providing many
examples of elite colleges and universities embracing distance learning).
302. Best Practices, supra note 289.
303. For a concise summary.of the lawsuit, see Robert J. Salzer, Note, JurisDoctor.com: Are
Full-Time Internet Law Schools the Beginning of the End for Traditional Legal Education?, 12
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 101, 111-12 (2004).
304. Herb D. Vest, Felling the Giant: Breaking the ABA 's Stranglehold on Legal Education in
America, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 494, 501 (2000).
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monopoly, the ABA, unlike the regional accreditors, is under no obligation to
change its policies; this same monopoly power also prevents the ABA from
experimenting with distance learning and seeing its results first hand. While the
ABA claims that distance learning cannot properly train lawyers, °5 at the time
such regulations were made the ABA had no way of knowing whether such a
belief was actually true, since it had not allowed for any lawyers to obtain
training through online law schools and then attempt the bar exam or practice
law.30 6 Since no experimentation took place, no one can point to any evidence to
find fault with the ABA's policies, thus perpetuating the status quo.
5. Parallels to the Resident Working Hours Controversy
Much of the distance learning experience applies to the resident work hour
regulation debate. The ABA shares many similarities with the ACGME, most
notably its monopoly status over accreditation in its field, which it uses to stifle
innovation and ensure homogeneity within legal education.30 7 Just as the
ACGME has not responded to evidence showing that work hour limits may not
promote patient safety, the ABA has ignored evidence showing that quality
degree programs can take place through distance learning.30 8 Furthermore, both
305. Scheeres, supra note 300.
306. While it is true that Concord Law School graduates are eligible to take the California Bar
Exam, the majority of Concord students enroll for personal enrichment without the intention of
taking a bar exam, since they are unable to take the bar exam in their own jurisdictions. (Though
Concord has more than 1800 students enrolled, only 660 have taken the First Year Law Student
Examinations required for students of non-ABA accredited schools who wish to take the Bar.
Concord Law School, School Information: Institutional Assessment Findings,
http://www.concordlawschool.com/info/custo m/concord/schoolinfo/assessment- findings.asp (last
visited Dec. 8, 2006).) Furthermore, Concord's lack of ABA accreditation inherently prevents it
from competing for the best students, since students who do wish to take the bar and become
lawyers after graduation will naturally gravitate toward ABA-accredited schools, which will allow
them to take the bar exam in any jurisdiction as well as provide them with greater employment
opportunities. Since many of the students Concord currently attracts who do take the bar exam are
those who would not have gotten into an ABA school, it is not really fair to use Concord's
California bar passage rates as an indictment on the potential of distance learning, since many such
individuals would likely have failed if they had attended a traditional law school. See Scheeres,
supra note 300.
307. See Harry First, Competition in the Legal Education Industry, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 327-
28 (1978) (arguing that the ABA has used its monopoly power to force law schools to adopt the
"elite-preference model" of legal education).
308. See, e.g., Thomas J. Balcezak et al., A Web-based Risk Management and Medical-Legal
Curriculum for Graduate Medical Education, 25 J. BIOCOMMUNICATION 2, 4 (1998) ("Those
residents who first browsed the educational module scored significantly higher on the quiz (81%)
VIl1 (2007)
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organizations have prevented natural or controlled experimentation from taking
place by using their monopoly power to institute nationwide regulations.30 9
than those who did not (62%)."); Tina M. Day et al., The Effects of World Wide Web Instruction
and Traditional Instruction and Learning Styles on Achievement and Changes in Student Attitude
in a Technical Writing in Agricommunication Course, 39 J. AGRIC. EDUC. 65 (1998) ("[S]tudents
who completed a writing course on the web exhibited higher achievement scores than those in
conventional instruction in the area of communication writings."); John Dutton et al., Do Online
Students Perform as Well as Lecture Students?, 90 J. ENGINEERING EDUC. 131, 131 (2001) ("These
results demonstrate that online students can perform at least as well as traditional students."); Scott
D. Johnson et al., Comparative Analysis of Learner Satisfaction and Learning Outcomes in Online
and Face-to-Face Learning Environments, 11 J. INTERACTIVE LEARNING RES. 29, 29 (2000)
("[T]here was no difference between the two course formats in several measures of learning
outcomes."); G. Klass & L. Crothers, An Experimental Evaluation of Web-Based Tutorial Quizzes,
18 Soc. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 508, 508 (2000) ("We find no significant differences on post test
scores between students who were assigned Web quizzes and those who were not."); L.A. Lockard,
The Impact of Technology Plans on Students' and Teachers' Learning, 29 TECH. HORIZONS EDUC.
J. 18, 24 (2001) (finding that integrating technology improved graduation rates); Krisanna
Machtmes & J. William Asher, A Meta-Analysis of the Effectiveness of Telecourses in Distance
Education, 11 AM. J. DISTANCE EDUC. 29, 43 (2000) ("There does not appear to be a difference in
achievement between distance and traditional learners."); M.S. Nessler et al., Professional
Socialization of Baccalaureate Nursing Students: Can Students in Distance Nursing Programs
Become Socialized?, 40 J. NURSING EDUC. 293, 300 (2001) ("[N]ursing students near completion in
distance nursing programs had significantly higher scores on two measures of socialization than did
campus-based nursing students."); Alan F. Smeaton & Gary Keogh, An Analysis of the Use of
Virtual Delivery of Undergraduate Lectures, 32 COMPUTERS & EDUC. 83, 92 (1999) ("The results
in this paper have shown that when virtual lectures are used in place of traditional delivery methods
there is no significant difference in attainment levels as measured by end of year examination
marks."); K.E. Umble et al., Effects of Traditional Classroom and Distance Continuing Education:
A Theory-Driven Evaluation of a Vaccine-Preventable Disease Course, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1218, 1222 (2000) ("No significant difference was found between the increases in knowledge and
self-efficacy for participants in the classroom and broadcast courses, both immediately following
and 3 months after the course."); Dan Camevale, What Matters in Judging Distance Teaching? Not
How Much It's Like a Classroom Course, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 21, 2001, available at
http://chronicle.com/free/2001/02/2001022101 u.htm ("The delivery mode we know for a fact does
not impact the learning."); Debbie Goldberg, Teaching Online, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 1998, at R04
("[T]he off-campus students perform just as well as their on-campus counterparts in the same
courses."); James V. Koch, How Women Actually Perform in Distance Education, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Sept. 11, 1998, at A60 ("[T]wo studies of students in Indiana ... found no statistically
significant difference."); Dennis A. Trinkle, Distance Education: A Means to an End, No More, No
Less, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 6, 1999, at A60 ("[T]here is clear evidence that distance
education can be as successful as classroom-based instruction, if not more so.").
309. See Vest, supra note 304, at 501 ("[I]f you try to offer legal education that is outside the
box, such as an affordable, convenient, online program, you are likely to end up without ABA
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If the ACGME's national monopoly over graduate medical education
accreditation (or the ABA's monopoly over legal education) were replaced with a
private decentralized system, like regional accreditation, experimentation would
take place. Private decentralized graduate medical education accreditors would
approach the resident work hour controversy just as regional accreditors
approached the distance learning issue: at first, each accreditor would create its
own policies using its best judgment, and then after sufficient evidence
accumulated, the accreditors would gather together to create a set of "best
practices" for the sake of uniformity. Through obtaining a significant amount of
data, as well as firsthand observations, the private decentralized accreditors
would select the best of all the attempted regulatory systems in order to create an
effective regulatory system that would best enhance patient safety while at the
same time retaining the support of residency program directors.
CONCLUSION
The resident work hour limit controversy has spurred considerable debate,
both over what limits, if any, should be instituted, as well as over which
organization should determine those limits. The free market's failure to account
for the patient safety externality, as illustrated by the death of Libby Zion, has
shown that some form of regulation is necessary; however, observable actions by
state governments and the ACGME have shown that neither can serve as an ideal
regulator. Though some have lobbied for the federal government to intervene,
310
it is doubtful that the federal government's involvement would improve the
situation.
Private decentralized regulation appears to be the best solution to the work
hour limit debate. By eliminating the ACGME monopoly over graduate medical
education and entrusting multiple regional accreditors with the ACGME's
current functions, individual accreditors would experiment with different
policies, with an ideal policy or combination of policies eventually manifesting
itself. As demonstrated by the distance learning case study, private decentralized
regulation does work in practice, and it has brought about better results than
private centralized regulation. It is likely, therefore, that a private decentralized
approach to the regulation of graduate medical education would best further the
goal of patient safety as well as provide the best framework for solving future
graduate medical education controversies.
approval.").
310. See, e.g., Am. Med. Student Ass'n, supra note 208.
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